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Abstract 
 
Merger Announcement Returns with Preparations 
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This paper analyzes the relationship between the merger announcement returns and the bidding 
firms’ preparations for mergers.  In this study, merger preparations are defined as bidding firms’ 
adaptive actions of changing their executives prior to mergers.  An analysis of the relative 
effectiveness of merger preparations is conducted through event study for univariate tests.  In 
addition, a regression for multivariate tests analyzes incentives for making merger preparations.  
The results of these studies indicate that (1) hiring of new executives from outside the target 
proves to be the most effective merger preparation, (2) firms who make merger preparations 
have higher returns, and (3) hiring of new executives from the targets proves to have negative 
effects on bidding firms’ returns, though this can vary based on the relative size of the target. 
 
 
Keywords: Merger preparation; Merger; Merger Announcement Returns  
 
JEL Classification: G34, D83 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 
 
2. Literature Review...........................................................................................................9 
2.1.  Trend of Merger ...........................................................................................................9 
2.2.  Market Reaction to Merger Announcement. ...............................................................9 
2.3.  Why Firms Merge ......................................................................................................10 
2.4.  Mergers and Merger Preparations ..............................................................................12 
 
3. Data ..............................................................................................................................13 
3.1.  Sample........................................................................................................................13 
3.2.  Merger Preparations ...................................................................................................14 
 
4. Empirical Methodology ...............................................................................................22 
4.1.  Event Study ................................................................................................................22 
4.1.1. Description of Event Study Set-up ........................................................................22 
4.1.2. Hypothesis..............................................................................................................24 
4.1.3. Event Study Results ...............................................................................................25 
4.1.4. Sign Test: Complement for Event Study ...............................................................27 
4.1.5. Further Analyses on Merger Preparations .............................................................27 
4.1.6. Implications 
: Relative Effectiveness of Different Types of Merger Preparations .....................32 
  
4.2.Multivariate Regression Analysis ................................................................................34 
4.2.1. Controls ..................................................................................................................34 
4.2.2. Implications: The Incentives for Merger Preparations ..........................................38 
 
5. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................39 
Reference .....................................................................................................................41 
Appendix ......................................................................................................................45 
 
 1 
 
1. Introduction 
Numerous recent studies show that bidders have slightly negative, but insignificant 
merger announcement returns (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Andrade, Mitchell, 
and Stafford, 2001) and this feature is explained by firm-specific characteristics
1
 (Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002), the choice of data base (Villalonga, 2004; Nanada, 2003; 
Lang and Stulz, 1994), and economic or managerial environments (Akbulut and 
Matsusaka, 2010; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996).  
All of the analyses have something in common.  They focus on the factors that are 
exogenously given to bidding firms and implicitly view those firms as static and passive 
economic agent since any efforts or changes by the bidding firms are not reflected in their 
analyses.  The preparations made by the firms which are planning to conduct a merger 
have been overlooked. 
On the contrary, I explicitly treat these firms as dynamic and active market 
participants that continue to develop their source of value and actively prepare for new 
economic environments, especially when uncertainties are involved.  Including such 
preparations in the process of merger distinguishes this research from the previous studies.
2
  
To attain positive merger announcement returns, bidding firms need to consider how to 
maximize the synergy from the merger and how to appeal to the market regarding the 
merger at the same time.  Taking these aspects into account, it is reasonable to postulate 
                                                        
1 Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) analyze bidder’s return depending on the types of target, the types of 
payment, and the relative size of target.   Targets are grouped by public, private, and subsidiary and the types 
of payment are categorized by cash, stock, and cash-stock combo.   
 
2
 Although Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) consider a firm’s efforts in the process of acquisition, they limit 
such efforts to the pre-acquisition activities which are meant for the revelation of target’s true value. 
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that bidding firms will make preparations to meet the purpose of the merger, to augment 
the source of their value, and to send signals to the market that they are ready to solve 
asymmetric information or uncertainty problems possibly occurring from the merger.   
In this research, I call such preparations “merger preparations” and define them as 
bidding firms’ adaptive actions of changing executives3  prior to mergers.  Regression 
analysis reports that the mergers with merger preparations result in higher returns than the 
mergers without merger preparation.  This result suggests that firms have incentives to 
conduct merger preparation prior to a merger.  In addition, hiring new executives from 
outside other than the target proves to be the most effective merger preparation by event 
study.   The earlier literature has interpreted the concept of merger preparations as the 
adjustment of organizational capabilities (Chandler, 1990), as the acquisition of general or 
firm-specific managerial capitals (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007), and as organizational 
changes inside of a firm (Friedman and Singh, 1989).      
 
Change of Top Executives and Its Effects 
Previous studies report that turnover of CEOs and CFOs has significant impacts on 
firms in many respects.  Firstly, the turnover of executives can change corporate financial 
policies.  Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find that the risk preferences of the CEOs and 
CFOs are significantly related to the corporate financial policies and their turnovers affect 
financial variables of leverage, cash holdings, debt maturity and accrual management.  
Secondly, the types of turnovers provide workers with different incentives to work.  While 
filling executive positions with insiders provides workers with incentives to put more 
                                                        
3
 I consider the mangers listed in the proxy statements of the Form-10K and Form DEF-14A as executives. 
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efforts into their work, allowing outsiders to fill the positions reduces such incentives for 
insiders (Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas, 2006; Chan, 1996).  Thirdly, the origins of 
new executives have different implications for the firms’ policies.  The executives from 
outside are more likely to change the corporate strategy and mission, while new executives 
from inside are more likely to maintain stability and continuity of the firm (Friedman and 
Singh, 1989).  Considering these impacts of executives’ turnovers, it is reasonable to 
assume that bidding firms select appropriate merger preparations that will equip 
themselves with the necessary organizational capabilities or managerial capitals.  In 
addition, it is also natural to presume that active bidding firms appeal to the market by 
disclosing their choice of merger preparations.   
The main focus of this research is to examine the effect of changing executives 
before mergers on bidding firms’ announcement returns.  More precisely, this study is 
aimed at investigating how the bidding firms’ merger announcement returns vary with the 
types of executives changes.  The two case studies below serve as exemplifications of 
bidding firm’s merger preparations and their effects.  
 
Case 1 
Dick’s Sporting Goods Inc. announced a merger with Golf Galaxy Inc on November 13, 
2006.  The purpose of this merger was to enter into the golf wear market and to boost 
profit margins by coordinating merchandise buying.  Dick’s hired Gwendolyn K. Manto as 
a Chief Merchandising Officer from Sears Holdings Co in January 2006 prior to this 
merger.  Although Ms. Manto did not have prior experience in the golf wear industry, she 
served as the General Merchandise Manager for Sears and as Chief Merchandising Officer 
 4 
 
for Stein Mart.  The acquisition of an executive with the skill set necessary for a successful 
merger with Golf Galaxy Inc. sent a strong signal to the market that Dick’s Sporting Goods 
Inc. was ready well poised for the merger.  This merger produced significant positive 
merger announcement returns.  
 
Case 2   
As President and CEO of Designs Inc. which operates retail clothing stores of Levi’s and 
Dockers, David A. Levin decided to implement a cost effectiveness initiative.  To achieve 
this goal, Mr. Levin planned merger with Casual Male Corp. with the intention of creating 
an efficient cost structure by combining Casual’s leading market position and Design’s 
operating capabilities.  As a requirement for successful merger and efficient cost structure, 
Designs Inc. had to reinforce management of internal operations.  In October 2001, 
Designs Inc hired Ronald N. Batts as a Senior Vice President of Operations.  Mr. Batts 
built up his management career in the clothing industry serving as Chief Operating 
Officers for various corporations.  The market interpreted his acceptance of Senior Vice 
President position with Designs Inc. as appropriate merger preparation.  When this merger 
was announced on May 2, 2002, Designs Inc produced significant positive merger 
announcement returns. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, I group merger preparations into four types based on 
the origins of the executives: 1) movements or job title changes of existing executives 
inside of bidding firms (merger preparation with insiders or MPI), 2) hiring of new 
executives from outside other than the targets (merger preparation outsiders or MPO), 3) 
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hiring of new executives directly from the targets (merger preparation with the executives 
of the target or MPT), and 4) no movements or changes of the executives in bidding firms 
(no merger preparation or NOMP).  The type of merger preparations that bidding firms 
select will differ from firm to firm since each bidding firm has a different purpose of 
merger.  Besides, some bidding firms possibly will merge with targets without merger 
preparation depending on the expected relative size of benefits and costs from the merger 
preparation.  
Under the assumption that an appropriate merger preparation is more likely to 
augment the integrated firm’s source of value as well as to appeal to the market regarding 
the benefits from the merger, I set up two main hypotheses.
4
  First, the mergers which 
begin with an appropriate merger preparation result in positive bidders’ returns during the 
merger announcement period.  Second, the firms that make merger preparations have 
higher returns during the merger announcement period than the firms that do not make any 
preparations.  I employ event study for the test of the first hypothesis and multivariate 
regression analysis for the test of the second.   
 
Findings and Implications 
From the event study analysis on the mergers between public firms, I find the 
relative effectiveness of different types of merger preparations.  The mergers with MPI 
produce insignificant negative cumulative abnormal return (henceforth CAR).  This 
finding indicates how the market interprets the succession of executives by insiders at the 
time of a merger.  Previous studies report that the succession by insiders provides other 
                                                        
4
 Hypotheses are presented in detail in the section 4.1 Event Study 
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insiders with better incentives to work hard.  On the other hand, such succession makes it 
more likely that less able candidates will assume executives positions (Agrawal, Knoeber, 
and Tsoulouhas, 2006).  In connection with mergers, however, the market appears to 
interpret the succession of executives by insiders as the evidence that less able candidates 
assume the positions, thus responds negatively to the merger announcement. 
The mergers which begin with MPO result in insignificantly positive CAR of 
0.17% for [-2, 1] and 0.45% for [-3, 1].  In contrast, the mergers with MPT bring about 
significant negative CAR of -2.91% for [-2, 1] and -3.06% for [-3, 1]; and these are the 
worst results.   It is an interesting finding that mergers with MPO result in positive CAR 
since previous studies have reported the estimates for bidding firms’ returns are, in general, 
negative and insignificant (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford, 2001).  Positive CAR found in the mergers with MPO seems to be in line with the 
recent trend in the CEO market that general managerial capital is becoming more 
important than firm-specific managerial capital (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007).
5
    
It is also an interesting and unanticipated finding that mergers with MP 3 result in 
the worst and significantly negative CAR.  Hiring new executives from the targets prior to 
mergers is expected to be the most helpful merger preparation, since those executives not 
only have practical knowledge and information on the target, but also can enhance 
commonality between two separate organizations.  However, markets take a completely 
opposite stand to the effects of MPT at the moment of merger announcement.  On this 
seemingly counterintuitive feature of MPT, I suggest some possible explanations such as 
                                                        
5
 Murphy and Zabojnik note that the shift in the relative importance of managerial capitals from general to 
specific brought about recent trend in the CEO market such as increase in outside hiring, increase in CEO 
pay levels, and increased prevalence of hiring outside CEOs with prior experience as CEO. 
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asymmetric response of the market to the targets and their executives, and sample bias 
generated by an unspecified industry. 
In the regression analysis for multivariate tests, I find that the mergers with 
preparations attain higher announcement returns than those without preparations when 
controlling for influences of the method of payments, the relative size of the target along 
with merger preparations.  The regression analysis clearly reports that the mergers with 
MPI and MPO bring about higher merger announcement returns for the bidding firms than 
the mergers with NOMP do.  Especially, MPO proves to be the most effective merger 
preparation in terms of CAR, and its positive effects are robust and do not vary according 
to the interactions with other explanatory variables.  On the contrary, the effects of MPT 
are variable according to the influences of method of payments and the relative size of the 
target.  When controlled for merger preparation only, the mergers with MPT have negative 
and even lower announcement returns than the mergers with NOMP.  However, such 
effects turn out to be positive when the method of payment is cash and the size of target 
becomes larger than the bidding firm in terms of market value.  
 
Validity of Merger Preparations  
In the analysis of the 160 acquisitions performed in the pharmaceutical industry, 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) clearly show that pre-acquisition activities by bidding firms 
such as alliances with their targets for R&D and for marketing help to avoid winner’s 
 8 
 
curse
6
 and also reduce post-acquisition uncertainties by disclosing the true underlying 
value of the targets.  Although incorporating bidding firms’ pre-acquisition activities into 
their analysis, Higgins and Rodriguez still limit the roles of pre-acquisition activities to the 
revelation of hidden information about the targets.  Value maximizing efforts by firms are 
expected to go beyond these alliances with their targets.  Firms will make efforts not only 
to comply with the purpose of mergers but also to enhance their source of value.  
Chandler (1990) describes organizational capabilities as the abilities of top and 
middle management which are transferable across businesses and argues that they are the 
source of value in a firm.  If organizational capabilities are the determinants of a firm’s 
value as Chandler argues, then it would be natural to expect that firms will adjust their top 
and middle managements prior to merger since merger is the integration of two separate 
and different organizational capabilities.  Moreover, legal and institutional restrictions are 
not strict enough to prevent employees from revealing the information and knowledge they 
obtained before (Mansfield, 1986; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Jinyoung Kim, 2005), 
and it is difficult to contract around misappropriation of such information and knowledge 
because courts do not want to restrict labor mobility (Dworkin and Callahan, 1998; Koh, 
1998; Gilson, 1999).  The sample of mergers in this research demonstrates that bidding 
firms acquired their targets with merger preparations of some type in 666 merger 
transactions of total 995 (66.9%) and this ratio continues to increase over time.    
                                                        
6
 The Winner’s curse states that acquirers are prone to overbid for a target firm and that the extent of this 
overbidding is positively correlated with the level of asymmetric information between acquirer and target 
firms. 
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   This paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, I review related literatures and 
discuss how to approach.  Section 3 describes the data, while Section 4 reports the results 
and interpretations.  Section 5 concludes this paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Trend of Merger 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) and Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) 
characterize the trend of mergers in each decade.    mergers gained steam in the 60s, 
reached its peak at the end of the decade and then went down.  Then in the 80s, related 
mergers started to increase.  This prevalence of related mergers continued in the 90s and its 
features are characterized as the occurrence of mergers in waves, and strongly clustered by 
industry (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996).   The trend of mergers is in line with the strictness 
of antitrust enactment (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Akbulut and Matsusaka, 
2010) and also with the advantages of using internal capital markets (Akbulut and 
Matsusaka 2010).  The increase of related mergers during the 80s and 90s is attributable to 
relaxed antitrust policy and well-developed external capital markets.   
 
2.2. Market Reaction to Merger Announcement 
There are debates over the value creation of mergers.  Empirical results vary 
depending on data sources and performance measures.  Stein (1997) argues that merger can 
increase the value of conglomerates since they can reduce sunk costs by forming portfolios 
and also enhancing information flows between divisions through internal capital markets.  
 10 
 
Using The Business Tracking Series(BITS)
7
, Villalonga (2004) shows that related merger 
is able to produce a premium rather than a discount.  However, Burch and Nanada (2003), 
and Lang and Stulz(1994) using Compustat data show that corporate mergers destroy firm 
value.   
In contrast, Lamont and Polk (2001) and Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) take 
a stance midway in between those two extremes.  Lamont and Polk argue that discounted 
firms are compensated by higher future asset returns, even if their current values are lower 
than those of single-segment firms.  Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) attribute the 
discount to the acquisition of already discounted firms, not to the corporate merger itself.    
There are common agreements on this issue that 1) it is difficult to claim that 
bidding firm’s shareholders are losers in merger transactions, but they clearly are not big 
winners like the target firm shareholders, and 2) there is no clear evidence that merger 
creates value to bidding firms and the estimates are negative even if they are not reliable 
(Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002). 
 
2.3. Why Firms Merge 
Market reactions to merger announcements raise an important question. If positive 
returns are not guaranteed, why do firms merge?  Weston, Siu, and Johnson (2001) explain 
that zero returns to bidding firms are consistent with a competitive corporate control 
market in which firms earn just normal returns in their operations.  Bruner (2001) finds 
that 60 to 70 percent of all merger transactions are associated with financial performances 
                                                        
7
 BITS covers the whole U.S. economy at the establishment level. 
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that at least compensate investors for their opportunity cost.  Besides, there are tremendous 
variations in returns and many firms are trying to be one of the winning firms.  
Regarding corporate mergers, Montgomery (1994) suggests three motives.  Firstly, 
firms conduct merger to obtain market power and they want to use the power in an anti-
competitive way such as cross-subsidization, mutual forbearance, and reciprocal buying.  
Secondly, firms conduct merger because managers can reap benefits at the expense of their 
shareholders.  Thirdly, firms conduct merger in response to excess capacity in productive 
factors.  As long as expansion provides more profitable ways of employing its underused 
resources, a firm has an incentive to expand. 
In contrast, Matsusaka (2001), from the viewpoint of dynamic value-maximization, 
explains the confusing fact that firms decide to conduct mergers in spite of their discount.  
According to Matsusaka, merger is an intermediate and less productive stage in a search 
process for industries that best match the firm’s organizational capabilities.  When the 
perfect match is found, a firm eventually specializes.  Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) 
develop a profit maximizing neoclassical model of optimal firm size and growth across 
different industries based on differences in industry fundamentals and firm productivity.  
As a firm’s returns to growing within an industry diminish, the firm limits its growth 
within the industry and moves into other industries.  In their model, the discount resulting 
from a merger is consistent with profit maximization.    The optimal number and size of 
industry segments in a firm is determined by its comparative advantage across industries. 
  
 12 
 
2.4. Mergers and Merger Preparations 
Many studies explain the relation between firm value and the change of top 
managers at the CEO levels: 1) market response to CEO succession (Friedman and Singh, 
1989), 2) CEO turnover after acquisition (Lehn and Zhao, 2006), 3) performance in 
diversified firms and CEO turnover (Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen, 2000).  CEO 
successions and turnovers in these studies are the events occurring after mergers and are 
considered as the effects of mergers, instead of the cause or the preparation.  On the 
contrary, Friedman and Singh (1989) argue that the change of top executives is an event 
interpreted as the reorganization inside of a firm and the market reactions to the change are 
determined by the person who fills the executive position.    
Chava and Purnanandam(2010) support Friedman and Singh’s argument by finding 
significant relationship between corporate financial policies and risk-taking incentives of 
CEOs and CFOs.  They show that CEOs’ risk-decreasing incentives are associated with 
lower leverage and higher cash balances.  CFOs’ risk-decreasing incentives are associated 
with safer debt maturity choices and higher earnings-smoothing through accounting 
accruals.      
By paying attention to the origins of the executives, Rosen (1986), Chan (1996), 
and Argrawal, Knoebel, and Tsoulouhas (2006) show the trade-off in the successions of 
executives. Providing favor to insiders for successions increases insiders’ incentives to 
work hard, but it lowers the chances that the best candidates will be selected as new 
executives.  In contrast, providing the opportunity for the successions of executives to 
outsiders raises the quality of new executives at the expense of lower commonality 
between new executives and the insiders.  Argrawal, Knoebel, and Tsoulouhas (2006) find 
 13 
 
there has been insider bias over the period between 1974 and 1995.  Executives tend to be 
promoted from within in normal times and outsiders are brought in to shake things up in 
bad times.  It is also explained by Friedman and Singh (1989) that the origins of new 
executives convey different signals.  The new executives from outside signal that there are 
changes in strategy and mission, while the new executives from inside signal stability and 
continuity.   
 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample8 
From Business Wire and PR Newswire in Lexis-Nexis Academic and Thompson 
ONE Banker, I collect 995 mergers which were successfully completed between January 1, 
1996 and March 31, 2007.  I use variations and combinations of the words “mergers” and 
“acquisitions” as search terms and find 390 cases from Business Wire and PR Newswire in 
Lexis-Nexis Academic.  In a further search of Thomson ONE Banker, I find an additional 
615 mergers by checking Custom League Tables in the M&A tab in the Deals Analysis 
menu.  By comparing the samples, I filter out the cases which are included in both data 
sources and count them once as a merger.   
Although the number of mergers during the same period surpasses the sample size, 
I narrow these mergers down to the cases which meet the following conditions: 
 
                                                        
8
 Table A. 2 in appendix shows how the merger sample is narrowed down to total available 995 merger 
cases. . 
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1) Both of the bidding and target firms are publicly traded on the AMEX, Nasdaq, or 
NYSE. 
2) Bidding firms have at least 180 days of return data prior to the merger 
announcement date listed on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) file. 
3) Only finished, completed, or finalized mergers are selected. 
4) If a bidding firm merges with more than two targets at a time, I count them as one 
event. 
5) The merger announced first is counted as an event in clustered mergers where a 
bidding firm merges with more than two targets within each event window. 
 
If the firms are in the list of CRSP, I consider them as publicly traded firms.  I 
exclude the mergers where the bidding firms have return data of less than 180 days prior to 
the merger announcement date.  In order to exclude rumor effects on the returns of bidding 
firms, I select the mergers which are announced with the terms such as finished, 
completed, or finalized.  By selecting the merger which is announced first as an event in 
clustered mergers, I prevent the effects of merger announcement on the returns from being 
overstated or understated.  
 
3.2. Merger Preparations 
I define merger preparations as bidding firms’ adaptive actions of changing 
executives prior to mergers.  Since previous research has not addressed merger 
preparations of this type, including them in the process of a merger is a distinctive 
 15 
 
contribution of this research to the field.  The idea that merger preparations may affect 
merger announcement returns arises from the assumptions that appropriate merger 
preparation is more likely to maximize the synergy between merging firms, send positive 
signals to the market regarding the effectiveness of merger, and also make it possible to 
avoid overpayment due to more accurate valuations of a target.  Many studies suggest that 
the turnovers or changes of executives may bring about various effects on the firm by (i) 
meeting the purpose of the merger when the merger is involved (Agrawal, Knoeber, and 
Tsoulouhas, 2006; Chan, 1996; Friedman and Singh, 1989), (ii) augmenting bidding firms’ 
source of value (Matsusaka, 2001; Chandler, 1990), and (iii) reducing uncertainties related 
with merger (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006).   
In order to identify merger preparations, I inquire into two proxy statements of 
Form-10K and Form DEF-14A
9
that are filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (S.E.C).  Firstly, I find the changes of executives in bidding firms by 
investigating the statements.  Next, to select the changes which occurred less than a year 
prior to the mergers, I take special care to compare merger announcement day with the 
month and the year of the changes in each merger.
10
 Further, I classify each merger 
preparation into subcategories based on the closeness of executives’ management career to 
the targets, since these proxy statements also include information on the executives’ 
management career which can be traced back up to 5 years from the filing date. 
                                                        
9
 Form 10K is an annual report to S.E.C and includes information such as company history, organizational 
structure, executives’ compensation, equity, subsidiaries, and audited financial statements.  Form DEF-14A 
is a definitive proxy statements and includes information on the date, time and place of the meeting of 
security holders, revocability of proxy, dissenter’s right of appraisal, persons making the solicitation, director 
or indirect  interest of certain persons in matters to be acted upon, modification or exchange of securities, 
financial statements, voting procedures and other details.  
 
10
 These statements provide the month and year of the changes of executives in bidding firms. 
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Firstly, based on the origins of the executives, I categorize merger preparations into 
two groups such as the movements or job title changes of existing executives inside of 
bidding firms and the hiring of new executives from outside of bidding firms.  In the latter 
case, I take special care to divide this category into another two types: hiring new 
executives from outside other than the targets and hiring them directly from the targets.  
Secondly, I classify each merger preparation into subcategories based on the closeness of 
new executives’ management career to the targets.   By comparing the first two digit of 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), I measure the closeness of management career to 
the targets.  The executives who have worked for the firms which operate in the same 
industry as the target are considered to have a closer management career than those who 
have not.  Lastly, no merger preparation represents the case in which there are no changes 
or movements of the executives in the bidding firms. 
The main problem arising in the categorization of merger preparations is the 
existence of the mergers in which bidding firms make more than two different merger 
preparations at the same time.  To address this problem, I construct criteria on the relative 
importance of merger preparation and then take the most important one as a merger 
preparation for the merger.  The extent of the importance is determined by the closeness of 
new executives’ management career to the target.  The followings are the details of the 
criteria. 
 
1) Movement of executives from the targets to bidding firms is the most 
important merger preparation.  
 17 
 
2) Regardless of their origins, the executives who have closer relationships 
with the targets are more important.  
3) Hiring of new executives from outside is more important than the 
movements or job title changes of existing executives in the bidding firms,   
if the new executives have same level of closeness to the target. 
 
Hiring of new executives from the target is the most important merger preparation 
since they have the closest management career to the target.  In the case that new 
executives have different level of closeness to the target in their management career, I 
consider the hiring of the executives who have closer management career as a merger 
preparation regardless of their origins.  If the closeness of management career to the target 
is the same, then I consider the hiring of new executives from outside as more important 
merger preparation than the movement of existing executives inside of bidding firms 
reflecting the recent trend in CEO market.
 11
   
 
Merger Preparation with Insiders 
Merger preparation with insiders (MPI) is defined as the movements or job title 
changes of existing executives in bidding firms.  MPI includes both of vertical and 
horizontal changes in the titles of executives.  In addition to increasing insiders’ incentives 
to work hard (Argrawal, Knoebel, and Tsoulouhas, 2006; Chan 1996; Rosen, 1986), the 
choice of MPI as a merger preparation is expected to reinforce bidding firm-specific 
                                                        
11
 General managerial capital is more important than firm specific managerial capital (Murphy and Zabojnik, 
2007).  
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managerial capitals and send signals of stability and continuity within the bidding firms’ 
strategy and mission (Friedman and Singh, 1989).  Depending on the closeness of 
executives’ management career to the targets, I classify MPI into three subcategories. 
 
1) MPI-A: Movements or job title changes of executives who have worked for the   
               target.   
2) MPI-B: Movements or job title changes of executives who have worked for the  
              firms which operate in the same industry as the target.
12
   
3) MPI-C: Movements or job title changes of executives who have not worked for  
              the firms which operate in the same industry as the target.  
 
MPI-A is expected to provide bidding firms with target-related information to some 
extent since the executives have worked for the target before.  However, its effect as a 
merger preparation is expected to be restricted in comparison to MPT.  Since the 
movements of the executives in MPI-A have occurred irrespective of the merger, the effect 
on the bidding firms’ returns does not seem to be as strong as that of MPT.  
   
Merger Preparation with Outsiders 
Merger preparation with outsiders (MPO) is defined as the hiring of new executives by 
bidding firms from outside themselves and their targets.  Strengthening of the bidding 
firms’ general managerial capital is the expected benefit from MPO (Murphy and 
                                                        
12
 In terms of 2 digit SIC 
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Zabojnik, 2007).  Besides, it is expected to raise the quality of new executives (Argrawal, 
Knoebel, and Tsoulouhas, 2006) and send signals of changes in strategy and mission 
(Friedman and Sing, 1989).  Even if it does not provide target firm-specific managerial 
capital, bidding firms are expected to be able to obtain target-related managerial capital to 
some extent depending on how closely the management career of new executives is 
connected to the target.  I divide MPO into two subcategories based on the closeness of 
new executives’ management career to the target and examine if the two subcategories 
make differences in their effects as a merger preparation. 
 
1) MPO-A: Hiring of new executives who have worked for the firms which operate in  
              the same industry as the target. 
2) MPO-B: Hiring of new executives who have not worked for the firms which 
              operate in the same industry as the target. 
 
Merger Preparation with the Executives of the Target 
Merger preparation with the executives of the target (MPT) is defined as the hiring 
of new executives by bidding firms directly from their targets.  The selection of MPT is 
expected to provide the bidding firms with benefits in many respects.  One of them is the 
target-related information and the bidding firms, with the help of it, will be able to 
overcome asymmetric information or uncertainty problems.  Moreover, the bidding firms 
are expected to be able to shorten the adaptation period for successful management of the 
merged firms thanks to the executives joining with target firm-specific managerial capital.  
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However, the choice of MPT may create negative effects for the bidding firms since it is 
possible that the market attributes the mergers to bad management by the executives of 
targets.  Since all of those new executives come from the target, it is impossible to 
subcategorize MPT based on the closeness of executives’ management career to the target. 
Instead, I divide MPT into three subcategories based on the positions taken by the 
executives of targets in the bidding firms.     
 
1) MPT-A: The hiring of new executives from the target as board members in the  
              bidding firm. 
2) MPT-B: The hiring of new executives from the target as executives in the bidding  
              firm. 
 
3) MPT-C: Overlapping board membership between bidding firms and targets. 
 
No Merger Preparation 
No merger preparation (NOMP) is the case that there are no movements or job title 
changes of executives in the bidding firms.    Depending on the expected relative size of 
costs and benefits from merger preparations, firms may choose to perform mergers without 
preparations.  However, the effects of NOMP are expected to be negative on the bidding 
firms’ merger announcement returns.  Even if the effects are positive, the mergers with 
NOMP are expected to attain lower CAR than any other mergers that begin with 
preparations.  In the regression analysis for multivariate tests, I take the mergers with 
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NOMP as the base.  By measuring the difference of cumulative abnormal returns from the 
base, I verify bidding firms’ incentives for making merger preparations. 
Table 1 summarizes how merger preparations are categorized and also how each 
merger preparation is subcategorized based on the closeness of new executives’ 
management career to the targets.  Table 2 displays the frequency of mergers that 
accompany any type of merger preparations and its change before and after the enactment 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
13
.  SOX is enacted to enhance the quality of information 
disclosed by the public firms.  On the condition that SOX is effective, it is legitimate to 
examine and compare the effect of merger preparations before and after the enactment of  
SOX.       
Out of total 995 mergers, firms make any types of merger preparations in 666 
mergers (about 66.9%) during the whole sample period and the frequency of merger 
preparations has increased from 62.7% to 74.2% since the enactment of SOX on July 30, 
2002.
14
  Table 3 reports the frequency of each merger preparation in more detail.  MPI is 
the most frequently adopted merger preparation and this indicates that insider bias in the 
successions of executives (Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas, 2006)
15
 may still exist even 
if the successions are involved with mergers.  The frequency of MPO is the lowest among 
the merger preparations including NOMP.   
 
                                                        
13 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifies the responsibility of corporate officers for the accurate financial reports.  
Therefore, it is possible to make more accurate inference on the effectiveness of merger preparations as well 
as the management performance of executives.          
14
 See Table A.2 and Table A.3 in Appendix.  These tables report the number of mergers available in each 
year in detail. 
15
 Over the period of 1974 – 1995, about 80 % of all CEO successions were internal successions. 
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Firms may prefer either specific merger preparation or no merger preparation.  This 
preference, however, does not guarantee the effectiveness of the merger preparation.  
Although it is MPO that bidding firms adopt less frequently as their merger preparation 
than MPI, MPT and NOMP, it is also MPO that proves to be the most effective merger 
preparation in both event study and regression analysis in terms of cumulative abnormal 
returns.  The event study for univariate tests finds that only the mergers with MPO attain 
positive cumulative abnormal returns.  In addition, regression analysis for multivariate 
tests confirms the effects of MPO verified by event study.  Such effect of MPO does not 
vary according to the influence of other explanatory variables, and the mergers with MPO 
attain significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns than the mergers with NOMP.  
   
4. Empirical Methodology 
4.1. Event Study 
4.1.1. Description of Event Study Set-up 
I employ event study methodology to investigate the responses of bidding firms’ 
merger announcement returns to the choice of merger preparation.  In this analysis, I 
consider each merger as an event.  In cases that one bidding firm merges with more than 
two targets on the same day or on adjacent days to cause overlapping event windows, I 
select only the first merger as an event.  To circumvent the effects arising from sudden 
changes in the number of shares
16
, I use holding period returns from CRSP to construct 
                                                        
16
 Sudden changes in the number of shares result from stock split or stock repurchase.    
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daily returns for each firm.
17
  Since the market begins responding to the announcement two 
days in advance and the announcement typically appears in the Wall Street Journal the day 
after it is released (Filson, 2004), I use an event window of [-2, 1] which includes two days 
before and one day after the announcement, and also use another event window of [-3, 1] 
which includes three days before and one day after the announcement to check robustness 
of the result.
18
  I refer to Thomson One Bankers for the exact dates of each merger 
announcement.
19
 For the computation of CARs for both event windows of [-2, 1] and        
[-3, 1], I follow MacKinlay’s (1997) standard event study methodology.  
 
                                                                                                       ( ) 
                                         (  )           (  )    
   
                                                 ̂    ̂                                          ( ) 
 
Equation (1) is the market model for a firm conducting merger   where    and    
are the holding period return for the firm conducting merger    and the value-weighted 
market index return, respectively.  I use a simple market model instead of a more 
complicated asset pricing model, since, with the relatively short event window of analysis, 
the way expected returns are estimated when calculating abnormal returns has little effect 
                                                        
17
 Abnormal returns can be overstated or understated if they are derived from the returns calculated with 
daily closing prices. 
18
 Table A.5 and A.6 in the appendix report additional results of event study and sign test, respectively 
conducted for the event window of [-1, 0], [0, 1], and [-1, 1]. 
19
 Thomson One Banker provides “SDC Deal No” which reports announcement date of each merger. 
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on inferences (Brown and Warner, 1985; Fama, 1991).
20
  The abnormal return of a firm 
conducting merger   which is     in equation (2) is the forecast error term of the market 
model.  
The length of estimation window is 180 days prior to the merger announcement 
date.  I delete the period covered by the event windows from the sample, estimate market 
model, and compute the cumulative abnormal returns of an event by summing the forecast 
errors during its event window.  By aggregating cumulative abnormal returns from each 
merger which is categorized by the types of merger preparations, I compute aggregate 
cumulative abnormal returns for each merger preparation.  
  
4.1.2. Hypothesis 
The inclusion of merger preparations in the process of mergers suggests testable 
hypotheses concerning the effects of each merger preparation.  For the tests of these 
hypotheses, I employ event study method and try to verify relative effectiveness of 
different types of merger preparations by comparing their cumulative abnormal returns.     
 
1) Hypothesis 1: The movements or job title changes of existing executives in bidding  
                       firms change their merger announcement returns. 
2) Hypothesis 2: Bidding firms’ hiring of new executives from outside other than their  
                       targets changes their merger announcement returns. 
                                                        
20
 Considering Fama-French three factors and momentum factor, I conducted multifactor model to derive 
abnormal returns.  The results from multifactor model are similar to those of simple market model.  The 
results for event study and sign test are reported in the table 7.A and 8.A, respectively. 
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3) Hypothesis 3: Bidding firms’ hiring of new executives directly from their targets  
                       changes their merger announcement returns. 
4) Hypothesis 4: No changes or movements of executives in bidding firms change the  
                       bidding firms’ merger announcement returns. 
 
In addition, I use sign test to check the robustness of the effects of each merger 
preparation verified in the event study.  Since the simple comparisons between CARs are 
open to distortion by a few extreme cases, sign test helps to generalize the relative 
effectiveness of different types of merger preparations proved by event study.  Further, I 
also employ regression analysis to supplement the event study.  Considering various 
influences of economic factors simultaneously in the regression analysis for multivariate 
tests, I find bidding firms’ incentives for making merger preparations.     
 
4.1.3. Event Study Results 
Table 4 reports the effects of each merger preparation on the bidding firms’ 
announcement returns in terms of CARs.  CARs are calculated for four days [-2, 1] and 
five days [-3, 1] around the announcement day (day 0) of the mergers.  Among the merger 
preparations along with no merger preparation, only MPO produces positive CAR.   
Mergers with MPI result in statistically insignificant negative CARs of -0.40% for 
[-2, 1] and -0.48% for [-3, 1].  MPI does not seem to be effective as a merger preparation 
since it does not make any difference in CAR from the previous studies.  The estimates for 
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bidding firms’ merger announcement returns in general are reported to be negative and 
insignificant in the previous studies.  
Mergers with MPO produce a positive and insignificant CAR of 0.17% for [-2, 1] 
and 0.45% for [-3, 1].  This positive CAR may not appear to be a strong proof that MPO is 
an effective merger preparation because it is insignificant.   The regression analysis for 
multivariate tests in the section 4.2., however, reports that MPO not only produces positive 
CAR but also generates higher CAR than any other merger preparations do.  Therefore, 
MPO proves to be an effective merger preparation.  
The last two types of merger preparations, MPT and NOMP have obvious and 
similar effects on the bidding firms’ merger announcement returns: they prove to have 
negative and statistically significant effects in both of [-2, 1] and [-3, 1] periods.  Mergers 
with MPT which is the hiring of new executives directly from the targets end up with 
negative and significant CAR of -2.91% and -3.06% for [-2, 1] and for [-3, 1], respectively.  
Compared to other merger preparations including NOMP, the CAR from MPT turns out to 
be negative and the lowest level.  In fact, this is one of the interesting features that the 
event study reveals in the analysis of the relative effectiveness of different types of merger 
preparations.  The worst result from MPT seems to be counterintuitive to the expected 
benefits from the hiring of the executives who have target-related information.  In line with 
the closeness of executives’ management career to the targets, I suggest possible 
explanations on this feature in the next section.  Mergers with NOMP result in negative 
and significant CAR of -2.20% and -2.30% for [-2, 1] and [-3, 1], respectively.  These 
results correspond to the expectation that mergers with appropriate merger preparation will 
result in higher CARs than the mergers without merger preparation.      
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The event study results reveal that the reactions of the market to the merger 
announcement vary with the types of merger preparations performed by bidding firms.  
The robustness of these market reactions are also confirmed by the sign test.  Even if 
possible distortions by a few outliers are prevented by relying on the signs of CARs, there 
is no difference in the effects of each merger preparation from the results verified by event 
study. 
 
4.1.4. Sign Test : Complement for Event Study 
I employ a non-parametric sign test and check the robustness of the results from the 
parametric test which is the event study.  A sign test requires that CARs are independent 
across mergers and that the expected proportion of positive CAR under the null hypothesis 
is 0.5.  
 
                                                
                                                             where               . 
 
The sign test results in Table 5 display exactly the same pattern of the effects of 
merger preparations as the event study analysis.  In mergers with MPI, the proportion of 
positive CAR is less than 0.5 and it is not robust.  The mergers with MPO also attain a 
higher proportion of positive CAR than 0.5 even though the result is not significant.  In 
contrast, the mergers with MPT and with NOMP produce a significantly lower proportion 
of positive CAR than 0.5.  This coincidence of sign test results with the event study 
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analysis implies that the effects of each merger preparation are robust since they are not 
distorted by a few extreme cases. 
 
4.1.5. Further Analyses on Merger Preparations    
Before making a decision on merger preparations, bidding firms will take into 
account many factors such as costs and benefits from each type of merger preparations, the 
impacts on their values, and the market reactions to their selection of merger preparations.  
The reality of these conjectures on the bidding firm’s actions is confirmed by Higgins and 
Rodriguez (2006).  In their research on pharmaceutical industry, Higgins and Rodriguez 
incorporate the alliances with the target for research and marketing into bidding firm’s pre-
acquisition activities for obtaining of target-related information.  Their explicit 
incorporation of pre-acquisition activities into the acquisition process proves to bring about 
significant positive returns to the bidding firms.  One interesting feature, however, is that 
the effects of target-related information may vary depending on how bidding firms obtain 
such information. 
The event study that I employ for the analysis of merger preparation shows that 
hiring of executives who seem to have target-related managerial capitals or skills does not 
help bidding firms to obtain positive merger announcement returns.   It appears to be even 
counterintuitive that hiring of new executives directly from the target causes significantly 
negative merger announcement returns.  What is worse, the executives coming from the 
target ends up with disastrous result.  Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the 
relationships between the effect of each merger preparation and the target-related 
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managerial capitals or skills in more detail.  For the purpose of more detailed analysis, I 
subcategorize each merger preparation based on how close the new executives’ 
management career is related to the targets.  I conduct event study for the subcategorized 
merger preparations and also supplement this analysis with sign test.  These analyses 
confirm that target-related managerial capitals do not have a positive impact on bidding 
firm’s merger announcement returns.  The results of event study and sign test for 
subcategorized merger preparations are reported in the table 6 and table 7, respectively. 
 
Subcategories of Merger Preparation with Insiders 
I group MPI into three subcategories.  If the executives have prior experience of 
working for the target, then it is in MPI-A.
21
  If they have worked for the firms which run 
in the same industry as the target, then it is in MPI-B.  Lastly, if they have not worked for 
the firms which run in the same industry as the target, then it is in MPI-C.  All mergers in 
each subcategory of MPI end up with negative merger announcement returns.  MPI-B 
produces negative and significant merger announcement returns of -1.68% for [-2, 1] and   
-2.11% for [-3, 1].  MPI-C also turns out negative merger announcement returns but it is 
relatively more favorable to the bidding firms than the other two types.  On the contrary, 
MPI-A shows the strongest negative impact of -2.16% for [-2, 1] and -3.21 % for [-3, 1].  
However, these effects of MPI-A are open to dispute since they are not significant and also 
the sample size of MPI-A is only six.  The event study results of the three subcategories of 
MPI still hold in the sign tests reported in Table 7.   
                                                        
21
 Their movements to bidding firm are nothing to do with the merger in sample. 
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Even though their analysis has nothing to do with mergers, Agrawal, Knoeber, and 
Tsoulouhas (2006), suggest a way to interpret the negative effects of MPI.  Over the period 
between 1974 and 1995, there has been insider bias in CEO successions.  In normal times, 
the insiders succeed to the CEO positions and in bad times, outsiders are brought in to 
shake things up.  According to Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas, CEO successions by 
insiders provide better incentives for insiders to work hard but make it more likely that less 
able candidates will succeed to the CEO positions.  When successions by insiders occur 
along with a merger, the market seems to interpret this as the successions by less able 
candidates and to respond negatively to the merger announcement accordingly.  Moreover, 
successions by insiders could be the signal that the bidding firms do not evaluate the 
merger as an important one, since successions by insiders usually occur in normal times 
and do not involve big changes inside of bidding firms. 
 
Subcategories of Merger Preparation with Outsiders 
MPO is simply divided into two subcategories.  If newly hired executives have 
prior experience of working for the firms which run in the same industry as the targets, 
then it is in MPO-A.  If they have no prior experience of working for the firms which run 
in the same industry as the targets, then it is in MPO-B.  These two subcategories prove to 
have conflicting effects on bidding firms’ merger announcement returns.  The positive 
impact of MPO-B is big enough to offset the negative impact of MPO-A and lead the net 
effect of MPO to be positive.  These features of MPO are consistent with sign test, which 
shows exactly the same pattern as MPO-A and MPO-B.  These results of MPO can be 
attributable to the signal that successions by outsiders send to the market.  Since the 
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successions by outsiders usually occur in a bid to shake things up in bad times, the market 
interprets bidding firm’s selection of MPO as the signal of making active preparation for 
the merger.   
 
Subcategories of Merger Preparation with the Executives of the Target 
Instead of depending on how close the new executives’ management career to the 
targets is, I classify MPT into three subcategories based on the positions that the executives 
from the targets takes in the bidding firms.
 22
 If bidding firm hires new executives from the 
target as their board members, then it is in MPT-A.  If bidding firms hire new executives as 
their executives, then it is in MPT-B.  Lastly, MPT-C is the case of overlapping board 
membership that the executives work as a board member in the bidding firm and the target 
simultaneously.  All of these subcategories of MPT have negative and significant effects 
on bidding firms’ merger announcement returns.  In terms of CARs, overlapping board 
membership (MPT-C) reports the worst result of -6.74% for [-2, 1] and -7.06% for [-3, 1] 
in the event study.  However, the MPT-C is observed in the seven merger cases only and 
the sign test results reveal that the worst result from MPT-C could arise from distortion by 
a few extreme cases.  Considering the analysis of event study and sign test together, hiring 
of new executives from the targets results in the lowest and significant CAR of -3.98% for 
[-2, 1] and -3.44% for [-3, 1]. 
 
 
                                                        
22
 It is impossible to tell who has closer relationship with the targets among the executives who came together 
from the targets. 
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The Effect of Merger Preparation in the Six Months prior to Merger Announcement 
I restrict attention to the executives’ movements occurring in the six months prior 
to merger announcement.  This restriction decreases the number of mergers with 
preparation from 666 to 334 cases.
23
  While about 40% of MPI and MPO (42% and 38%, 
respectively) occur during this period, about 71% of MPT are conducted in the six months 
prior to merger announcement.   
Table 8 reports the effects of each merger preparation conducted in this period.  
Mergers with MPI result in statistically significant negative CAR of -1.05% for [-2, 1] and 
-1.30% for [-3, 1].  While the negative effects of MPI on the bidding firm’s value still hold 
during this period, they become significant and cause lower CARs.  Mergers with MPO 
produce positive insignificant CAR of 0.24% for [-2, 1] and 0.17% for [-3, 1].  This result 
suggests that the effect of MPO does not vary even if it is conducted close to merger 
announcement.  MPO proves to be an effective merger preparation in this period as well.  
The effect of MPT results in -3.04% for [-2, 1] and -3.27% for [-3, 1] and still turns out to 
be the worst.              
The event study reveals that the merger preparations conducted in the six months 
prior to merger announcement do not make big differences from the previous event study 
results.  Only differences are found in the level of CARs and in the significance of the 
MPI.  These results are confirmed by sign tests reported in table 9.
24
   
 
                                                        
23
 The number of mergers with MPI, MPO and MPT is 111, 70, and 153, respectively. 
24
 The results for various event windows of [-1, 0], [0, 1] and [-1, 1] are reported in table A.7 and A.8.  Table 
10, 11 and table 11 and 12 report the results of multifactor model analysis.  All these analyses reveal that 
merger preparations conducted in the six months prior to merger announcement do not make differences in 
their effects on the bidding firm’s value. 
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4.1.6 Implications 
: Relative Effectiveness of Different Types of Merger Preparations 
Summing up, hiring of new executives who seem to have target-related managerial 
capitals or skills does not have a positive effect on the bidding firms’ merger 
announcement returns.  Moreover, hiring of new executives directly from the targets has a 
negative and statistically significant effect which is the worst result among the merger 
preparations.  Only hiring of executives who do not have a target-related management 
career has a positive effect on the bidding firms’ merger announcement return.  I suggest 
several possible explanations to address these features, which appear to conflict with the 
expected effects of merger preparations.  
Firstly, the evaluation of the market on the effectiveness of different types of 
merger preparations could be closely linked to trends in the CEO market.  The increasing 
prevalence of appointing CEOs through external hiring rather than internal promotion 
reveals the importance of general managerial capital rather than firm-specific managerial 
capital (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007).  From this CEO market point of view, MPO 
corresponds with obtaining of general managerial capital and the market evaluates bidding 
firms’ efforts of conducing MPO as an effective merger preparation for a merger.  In 
addition, this trend in the CEO market can account for why the frequency of MPO is lower 
than the other two merger preparations: it is more costly to hire executives from outside 
because there is a severe competition for executives who are equipped with general 
managerial capital.   
Secondly, the market may respond asymmetrically to target firms and to the 
executives of the targets.  Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) report that merger 
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premium is fairly similar across different types of merger transactions in the case of 
targets.
25
 However, these merger announcements can hurt the reputations of the executives 
in targets.  Although it needs additional research, becoming a target might be a signal of 
the failure in their management.  Therefore, bidding firms’ hiring of those executives could 
be negatively interpreted in the market in the merger announcement period when the 
uncertainty related with the merger is not yet resolved.   
Lastly, this result could be affected by sample bias.  The merger sample in this 
research was collected without specifying industry segment.  Therefore, the positive effects 
from certain industries could be offset by the negative impacts from other industries.  If I 
choose a specific industry to collect a merger sample, MPT may have positive and 
significant impacts as Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) find in their research on the 
acquisitions in pharmaceutical industry.  Firms in pharmaceutical industry are research and 
development oriented and need target-specific knowledge and skills for continuous 
research and development even after a merger.  Therefore, the market seems to evaluate 
positively the hiring of executives from the targets by bidding firms in the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
Another question that I want to verify in this research is why firms want to make 
merger preparations.  If the mergers with merger preparations result in higher 
announcement returns than the mergers without them, then this not only proves the 
benefits of merger preparations but also verifies the incentives for bidding firms to make 
merger preparations.  I use multivariate regressions to address this question. 
                                                        
25
 According to Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), target firms consistently have abnormal returns of 
16 % in the announcement period which is stable over the period between 1972 and 1989. 
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4.2. Multivariate Regression Analysis  
4.2.1. Controls 
In this section, I perform multivariate tests on the determinants of bidding firms’ 
announcement returns.  Table 12 reports the relationship between CARs for both event 
windows of [-2, 1] and [-3, 1] and the factors that are expected to affect bidding firms’ 
announcement returns.  In addition to each merger preparation, I include method of 
payments and relative size of target in the regressions as explanatory variables.
26
 The 
method of payments is classified into five types of cash, combination of cash and stock, 
stock, other,
27
and unknown.  I compute relative size of target in each merger by comparing 
the market value of the bidding firm and the target.  The market value is the product of the 
price 30 days before the announcement date and common shares outstanding on CRSP.  I 
divide relative size of target into four categories: 1) less than 9.99%, 2) 10% to 49.99%, 3) 
50% to 99.99%, and 4) greater than 100%.  Controlling for the relative size of target is 
expected to capture market reactions which may vary with the size of targets.  By including 
method of payments and relative size of target into the regressions, I give insights into the 
interactions between bidding firms’ choice of merger preparation and the other information 
conveyed by merger announcements.   
Regression (1) and (5) in table 12 are controlled only for merger preparations and 
the base is no merger preparation.  In these two regressions, mergers with MPI have higher 
CARs than the base case of merger without merge preparation by 1.2 % point for [-2, 1] 
                                                        
26
 I also run regressions on the deal attitude such as friendly, hostile, or neutral. However they do not report 
any economically meaningful results. 
27
 Other includes options, warrants, rights, or combination of them. 
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and 1.1% point for [-3, 1] and both CARs are significantly higher at the 10% level.  The 
difference in the CAR becomes more distinguished and robust between the mergers with 
MPO and the mergers with NOMP.  The mergers with MPO end up with higher CAR than 
the base by 1.9 % point for [-2, 1] and by 2.2 % point for [-3, 1], and these CARs in the 
mergers with MPO are significantly higher at the 1% level.  Moreover, the mergers with 
MPO bring about much higher CARs than the mergers with MPI do by 0.7 % point for     
[-2, 1] and by 1.1 % point for [-3, 1].  These patterns that the mergers with MPI and MPO 
produce higher CARs than the mergers with NOMP are observed in the rest of all 
regressions regardless of controls.  Therefore, bidding firms have enough incentives to 
change their executives with existing members or to hire new executives from outside prior 
to merger rather than to merge with targets without any preparations.   
On the contrary, there seems to be a negative relationship between MPT and 
bidding firms’ announcement returns.  As regression (1) and (5) display, the mergers with 
MPT end up with lower CARs than the base by 1.3% point for [-2, 1] and 1.4 % point for  
[-3, 1], and these differences are significant at the 5% level.  These results coincide with 
what event study for univariate tests shows.  However, it seems to be too hasty to make a 
conclusion that hiring new executives from the target is a merger preparation that is of no 
effect, since the negative effects of MPT vary with controls.   
When I control for all influences of merger preparations, method of payments, and 
relative size of target at the same time, the effect of MPT may turn into expectedly positive 
relationship with CARs as regression (4) and (8) in table 12 display.  The selection of 
certain method of payment and the target size that is smaller than the bidding firm still 
result in negative relationship between MPT and CARs.  However, the effect of MPT turns 
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the negative relationship into a positive one when the target which is larger than the 
bidding firm is acquired with cash.  In such mergers, MPT produces higher CAR than 
NOMP by 0.4% point for [-2, 1] and by 0.3% point for [-3, 1] as regression (4) and (8) 
show.  The market seems to put higher valuation on hiring new executives from the target 
which is larger than the bidding firm.
28
  In contrast, the lowest valuation seems to be put on 
hiring new executives from the target which is similar size with bidding firm, that is, 50% 
to 99.99%. 
 
Interactions of Merger Preparations with Other Factors 
 By examining the interactions of each merger preparation with other factors such as 
method of payment and relative size of target, I analyze how the effects differ by the types 
of merger preparation.  While high-valued bidding firms use cash or higher proportion of 
cash to signal their value to the market, bidding firms may not want to use cash if the 
target’s value is uncertain since they may end up with overpayment (Fishman, 1989; 
Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990; Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel, 1990).  Hansen 
(1987) and Eckbo and Thorbun (2000) address this issue and suggest that bidding firms 
use stock offers when there is high uncertainty on the target’s value.  Examining the 
method of payment may reveal the merging firms’ value and financial risk related with 
uncertainty in a merger indirectly.   
 As table 13 reports, cash payment in a merger results in positive CARs regardless 
of merger preparation types.  Except the mergers with MPO, these positive CARs are 
found significant.  I interpret this to suggest that a cash offer implies that bidding firms are 
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 In 13 cases, bidding firm merged with a larger target along with MPT. 
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high valued and the market responds to this.  While the mergers with MPT produce 
insignificant positive CARs, MPI and MPO result in negative CARs.  As previous studies 
show, the implication of stock offer may have negative effect on the value of merger which 
is evaluated by the market.  However, hiring of new executives from the target seems to 
offset this negative signal of stock offer and produce positive insignificant CARs.  In the 
mergers with MPO, the positive effect of cash offer is found insignificant and the negative 
effect of stock offer is found significant.  These results can be attributed to the cost of 
MPO.  Considering the trend in the CEO market, MPO is identified as the most expensive 
merger preparation and this may weaken positive effect and strengthen negative effect 
from the aspect of costs related with merger preparation.      
 In the merger with a similar sized target, MPI does not seem to be suitable merger 
preparation.  MPI results in significant and negative CARs.  MPO and MPT are found as 
effective merger preparations for the merger with larger-sized targets.
29
      
 
4.2.2. Implications 
: The Incentives for Merger Preparations 
Summing up, bidding firms have incentives to make merger preparations prior to 
their mergers since the mergers with preparations produce higher merger announcement 
returns than the mergers without preparations do.  Especially, MPO proves to be the most 
effective merger preparation in both event study for univariate tests and regression analysis 
for multivariate tests.  The effect of MPO is so robust and consistent that it does not vary 
                                                        
29
 Results for multifactor model are reported in the table14.  In addition, I analyzed interactions of merger 
preparations with other factors for various event windows of [-1, 0], [0, 1] and [-1, 1] and reported the results 
in the table A.13 and A.14 
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with the influences of other factors which are expected to affect CARs.  Although MPT 
shows significant negative effects on the bidding firms’ merger announcement returns in 
the event study for univariate tests, its effects vary when the interactions with other factors 
are considered.  When bidding firms merge with targets which are greater than their size in 
terms of market value, MPT produces positive returns in the merger announcement period.  
When the bidding firm merges with a relatively big target, the market seems to interpret 
the hiring of target’s executives as obtaining of important managerial capital for the 
merged firm and its future success.   
 
5. Conclusion 
I examined the relationships between bidding firms’ merger announcement returns 
and their merger preparations.  From the event study for univariate tests, I find the relative 
effectiveness of different merger preparations.  Hiring of new executives from outside 
other than the target proves to be the most effective merger preparation and produces 
positive bidding firms’ announcement returns.  This result seems to be in line with the 
recent trend in the CEO market that general managerial capitals are becoming more 
important than firm-specific managerial capitals.  In contrast, hiring of new executives 
directly from the target ends up with negative merger announcement return which is robust 
and the worst result.  To address this seemingly counterintuitive feature, I suggest possible 
explanations in connection with the market evaluation to the trend in the CEO market, 
asymmetric response of the market to the target and the executives of the target, and 
sample bias. 
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In the regression analysis for multivariate tests, I examine the effects of merger 
preparations on the bidding firms’ returns by considering the influence of method of 
payments and relative size of target.  This analysis validates the incentives of bidding firms 
for making merger preparations prior to their mergers.  The mergers with merger 
preparations give rise to higher announcement returns than the mergers with no merger 
preparation do.  This result also suggests that hiring of new executives directly from the 
target can have a positive effect depending on the influences of other factors, although its 
effects prove to be negative in the event study for simple univariate test.  Especially, hiring 
new executives from the target produce positive announcement returns in the mergers 
where the relative size of the target is greater the bidding firm.            
In this study, I incorporate bidding firms’ actions of changing their executives into 
the process of merger without focusing on specific industry and executives.  It would be of 
interest to see if the effects of merger preparations vary with industry segments or with the 
specific type of executives. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
Categories of Merger Preparations 
 
Merger Preparation with Insiders 
(MPI) 
The movements or job title changes of existing 
executives in bidding firms 
MPI – A 
The movements or job title changes of existing 
executives who have worked for the target 
MPI – B 
The movements or job title changes of existing 
executives who have worked for the firms which operate 
in the same industry as the target 
MPI – C 
The movements or job title changes of existing 
executives who have not worked for the firms which 
operate in the same industry as the target 
Merger Preparation with Outsiders 
(MPO) 
The hiring of new executives by bidding firms from 
outside other than the target 
MPO – A 
The hiring of new executives who have worked for the 
firms which operate in the same industry as the target 
MPO – B 
The hiring of new executives who have not worked for 
the firms which operate in the same industry as the 
target 
Merger Preparation with the 
Executives of the Target  
(MPT) 
The hiring of new executives by bidding firms directly 
from the target 
MPT – A 
The hiring of new executives as board members in the 
bidding firms 
MPT – B 
The hiring of new executives as executives in the 
bidding firms 
MPT – C 
Overlapping board membership in the bidding firm and 
the target 
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Table 2 
How often Firms Prepare for Merger 
 
I define merger preparations as bidding firms’ adaptive actions of changing executives 
prior to merger.  To identify merger preparations, I look up two proxy statements such as 
Form-10K and Form-14A which are filed for U.S. Securities and Exchange Commissions 
(S.E.C).  In case that bidding firms make multi-merger preparations, I select out the most 
critical merger preparation by following consistent criteria. 
 
 
Before SOX 
(1996 – 2002.7) 
After SOX 
(2002.8 – 2007. 3) 
Whole Period 
(1996 – 2007. 3) 
Total Mergers 627 368 995 
Mergers with Preparations 393 273 666 
Mergers without Preparations 234 95 329 
% of Mergers with Preparations 62.7 % 74.2 % 66.9 % 
         SOX: “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” which was enacted July 30, 2002 
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Table 3 
Mergers with Merger Preparation vs. Mergers with No Merger Preparation 
 
I define merger preparations as bidding firms’ adaptive actions of changing executives 
prior to merger.  To identify merger preparations, I look up two proxy statements such as 
Form-10K and Form-14A which are filed for U.S. Securities and Exchange Commissions 
(S.E.C).  In case that bidding firms make multi-merger preparations, I select out the most 
critical merger preparation by following consistent criteria. 
 
 MP 1 MP 2 MP 3 NOMP Total 
Whole Period 264 186 216 329 995 
Before SOX 166 115 112 234 627 
After SOX 98 71 104 95 368 
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Table 4 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Bidding Firms in Each Merger Preparation 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms that conducted merger preparations and no merger 
preparation during 12-year period between Jan, 1996 and Mar, 2007.  Cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated for the four days [-2, 1] and five days [-3, 1] around the announcement (day 0) of a merger.  
Abnormal returns are estimated using a simple market model: 
           ̂     ̂    
 where    is the return on firm   and   is the value-weighted market index return. The abnormal return is 
the disturbance term of the market model.   All bidding and target firms are publicly traded firms listed on 
the NYSE, Nasdaq, or AMEX. 
 
 MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Four-Day of Event Window 
[-2, 1] 
-0.0040 
(264, -1.45) 
0.0017 
(186, 0.40) 
-0.0291 
(217, -7.27***) 
-0.0220 
(329, -5.41***) 
Five-Day of Event Window 
[-3, 1] 
-0.0048 
(264, -1.55) 
0.0045 
(186, 0.96) 
-0.0306 
(217, -6.84***) 
-0.0230 
(329, -5.07***) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
 
Table Entry is:  
Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(Number of Events, Test Statistic for Significance of Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns) 
MPI denotes the movement or job title changes among existing executives in bidding firms. 
MPO denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms from outside except target. 
MPT denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms directly from target. 
NOMP denotes no changes on the executives’ roster and their titles in bidding firms. 
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Table 5 
Sign Test on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Sign test is based on the sign of cumulative abnormal returns.  This sign test requires that cumulative 
abnormal returns are independent across bidding firms and that the expected proportion of positive 
abnormal returns under the null hypothesis is 0.5.  Test statistic is  
 
  [
  
 
      ]
√ 
   
   (    ) 
where  is the number of merger which has positive CARs and  is the total number of mergers.   
 
 MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Four-Day of Event Window 
[-2, 1] 
-1.354 
(121, 143) 
0.733 
(98, 88) 
-5.171*** 
(70, 146) 
-4.796*** 
(121, 208) 
Five-Day of Event Window 
[-3, 1] 
-1.723* 
(118, 146) 
0 
(93,93) 
-5.443*** 
(68,148) 
-2.701*** 
(140,189) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
       
      Table Entry is:  
      Test Statistics 
      (Number of Positive CARs, Number of Negative CARs) 
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Table 6 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns and the Closeness of Executives with Targets (Event Study) 
 
I subcategorize merger preparation 1 and 2 based on the closeness of new executives with target.  I divide 
merger preparation into three cases depending on the position that new executives from target take in the 
bidding firm.  To trace working career of executives, I look into Form 10-K and Form DEF-14A filed to 
SEC.  They include working career of executives for 5 years. 
Panel A: Merger Preparation with Insiders 
 
Four-Days [-2, 1] Five-Days [-3, 1] 
MPI - A MPI - B MPI - C MPI - A MPI - B MPI - C 
-0.0216 
(6, -1.10) 
-0.0168 
(68, -2.53**) 
-0.0006 
(190, -0.17) 
-0.0321 
(6, -1.46) 
-0.0211 
(68, -2.84***) 
-0.0007 
(190, -0.18) 
MPI– A: the movements or job title changes of existing executives who used to work for the target. 
MPI– B: the movements or job title changes of existing executives who used to work for a firm which operates in  
               the same industry as the target. 
MPI –C: the movements or job title changes of existing executives who have not worked for a firm which operates  
               in the same industry as the target. 
 
Panel B : Merger Preparation with Outsiders 
 
Four-Days [-2, 1] Five-Days [-3, 1] 
MPO - A MPO - B MPO - A MPO - B 
-0.0008 
(79, -0.13) 
0.0035 
(107, 0.60) 
-0.0022 
(79, -0.33) 
0.0094 
(107, 1.46) 
MPO – A: the employment of new executives who have worked for a firm which operates in the same industry as   
                the target. 
MPO – B: the employment of new executives who have not worked for a firm which operates in the same industry   
                as the target.         
              
Panel C: Merger Preparation with the Executives of the Target 
Four-Days [-2, 1] Five-Days [-3, 1] 
MPT - A MPT - B MPT - C MPT - A MPT - B MPT - C 
-0.0234 
(136, -4.69***) 
-0.0398 
(73, -5.70***) 
-0.0674 
(7, -2.76***) 
-0.0283 
(136, -5.07***) 
-0.0344 
(73, -4.40***) 
-0.0706 
(7, -2.59***) 
MPT – A: the employment of executives from target as board members. 
MPT – B: the employment of executives from target as executives in bidding firms. 
MPT – C: overlapping board membership. 
 
Table Entry is:  
Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(Number of Events, Test Statistic for Significance of Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns) 
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Table 7 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns and the Closeness of Executives with Targets (Sign Test) 
 
I subcategorize merger preparation 1 and 2 based on the closeness of new executives with target.  I divide 
merger preparation into three cases depending on the position that new executives from target take in the 
bidding firm.  To trace working career of executives, I look into Form 10-K and Form DEF-14A filed to 
SEC.  They include working career of executives for 5 years. 
Panel A: Merger Preparation with Insiders 
 
Four-Days [-2, 1] Five-Days [-3, 1] 
MPI - A MPI - B MPI - C MPI - A MPI - B MPI - C 
-0.817 
(2, 4) 
-0.0398 
(73, -5.70***) 
-0.0674 
(7, -2.76***) 
-0.0283 
(136, -5.07***) 
-0.0344 
(73, -4.40***) 
-0.0706 
(7, -2.59***) 
MPI– A: the movements or job title changes of existing executives who used to work for the target. 
MPI– B: the movements or job title changes of existing executives who used to work for a firm which operates in  
               the same industry as the target. 
MPI –C: the movements or job title changes of existing executives who have not worked for a firm which operates  
               in the same industry as the target. 
 
Panel B : Merger Preparation with Outsiders 
 
Four-Days [-2, 1] Five-Days [-3, 1] 
MPO - A MPO - B MPO - A MPO - B 
-1.238 
(34, 29) 
2.030** 
(64, 43) 
-1.463 
(33, 46) 
1.257 
(60, 47) 
MPO – A: the employment of new executives who have worked for a firm which operates in the same industry as   
                the target. 
MPO – B: the employment of new executives who have not worked for a firm which operates in the same industry   
                as the target.      
                 
Panel C: Merger Preparation with the Executives of the Target 
Four-Days [-2, 1] Five-Days [-3, 1] 
MPT - A MPT - B MPT - C MPT - A MPT - B MPT - C 
-2.915*** 
(51, 85) 
-4.799*** 
(16, 57) 
-0.378 
(3, 4) 
-3.773*** 
(46, 90) 
-4.096*** 
(19, 54) 
-0.378 
(3, 4) 
MPT – A: the employment of executives from target as board members. 
MPT – B: the employment of executives from target as executives in bidding firms. 
MPT – C: overlapping board membership. 
 
Table Entry is:  
Test Statistics 
(Number of Positive CARs, Number of Negative CARs)  
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Table 8 
The Effect of Merger Preparations in the Six Months Prior to Merger Announcement 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms that conducted merger preparations and no merger 
preparation during 12-year period between Jan, 1996 and Mar, 2007.  Cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated for the four days [-2, 1] and five days [-3, 1] around the announcement (day 0) of a merger.  
Abnormal returns are estimated using a simple market model: 
           ̂     ̂    
 where    is the return on firm   and   is the value-weighted market index return.  These analyses on 
merger preparations are focused on the cases that occurred in the six months prior to merger 
announcement. 
 
 MPI MPO MPT 
Four-Day of Event Window 
[-2, 1] 
-0.0105 
(111, -2.15**) 
0.0024 
(70, 0.35) 
-0.0304 
(153, -5.98***) 
Five-Day of Event Window 
[-3, 1] 
-0.0130 
(111, -2.39**) 
0.0017 
(70, 0.22) 
-0.0327 
(153, -5.74***) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
 
Table Entry is:  
Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(Number of Events, Test Statistic for Significance of Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns) 
MPI denotes the movement or job title changes among existing executives in bidding firms. 
MPO denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms from outside except target. 
MPT denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms directly from target. 
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Table 9 
Sign Test on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(The Effect of Merger Preparations in the Six Months prior to Merger Announcement) 
  
Sign test is based on the sign of cumulative abnormal returns.  This sign test requires that cumulative 
abnormal returns are independent across bidding firms and that the expected proportion of positive 
abnormal returns under the null hypothesis is 0.5.  Test statistic is  
 
  [
  
 
      ]
√ 
   
   (    ) 
where  is the number of merger which has positive CARs and   is the total number of mergers.  These 
analyses on merger preparations are focused on the cases that occurred in the six months prior to merger 
announcement. 
 
 MPI MPO MPT 
Four-Day of Event Window 
[-2, 1] 
-0.664 
(50, 103) 
0.478 
(37, 33) 
-4.285*** 
(50, 103) 
Five-Day of Event Window 
[-3, 1] 
-1.044 
(48, 105) 
0 
(35, 35) 
-4.608*** 
(48,105) 
 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
       
      Table Entry is:  
      Test Statistics 
      (Number of Positive CARs, Number of Negative CARs) 
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Table 10 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Bidding Firms in Each Merger Preparation 
(Multifactor Models for Merger Preparation in the Six Months prior to Merger Announcement) 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms that conducted merger preparations and no merger 
preparation during 12-year period between Jan, 1996 and Mar, 2007.  Cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated for the four days [-2, 1] and five days [-3, 1] around the announcement (day 0) of a merger.  
Abnormal returns are estimated using a multi-factor market model by Fama-French (1993) or Carhart 
(1997): 
            (     )                           
 where    is the return on firm  ,   is the value-weighted market index return,   is the risk free rate, 
SMB is the difference between the return on the portfolio of “small” and “big” stocks, HML is the 
difference between the return on the portfolio of “high” and “low” book-to-market stocks, and UMD is 
the difference between the return on the portfolio of past one-year “winners” and “losers”.  These 
analyses on merger preparations are focused on the cases that occurred in the six months prior to merger 
announcement. 
    
 
 MPI MPO MPT 
Four-Day of Event Window 
[-2, 1] 
-0.0093 
(111, -1.96**) 
0.0047 
(70, 0.70) 
-0.0301 
(153, -6.04***) 
Five-Day of Event Window 
[-3, 1] 
-0.0130 
(111, -2.45**) 
0.0037 
(70, 0.50) 
-0.0322 
(153, -5.77***) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
 
Table Entry is:  
Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(Number of Events, Test Statistic for Significance of Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns) 
MPI denotes the movement or job title changes among existing executives in bidding firms. 
MPO denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms from outside except target. 
MPT denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms directly from target. 
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Table 11 
Sign Test on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Multifactor Models 
(The Effect of Merger Preparations in the Six Months prior to Merger Announcement) 
 
Sign test is based on the sign of cumulative abnormal returns.  This sign test requires that cumulative 
abnormal returns are independent across bidding firms and that the expected proportion of positive 
abnormal returns under the null hypothesis is 0.5.  Test statistic is  
 
  [
  
 
      ]
√ 
   
   (    ) 
where  is the number of merger which has positive CARs and   is the total number of mergers.  These 
analyses on merger preparations are focused on the cases that occurred in the six months prior to merger 
announcement. 
 
 MPI MPO MPT 
Four-Day of Event Window 
[-2, 1] 
0.285 
(57, 54) 
0.956 
(39, 31) 
-4.285*** 
(50, 103) 
Five-Day of Event Window 
[-3, 1] 
-0.854 
(51, 60) 
0.717 
(38, 32) 
-4.447*** 
(49,104) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
       
      Table Entry is:  
      Test Statistics 
      (Number of Positive CARs, Number of Negative CARs) 
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Table 12  
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analyses of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Ordinary least squares regression of the bidding firms’ four-day and five-day cumulative abnormal returns on the following variables. First three dummy 
variables are defined as whether the bidding firm conducted merger preparations.  The next four dummy variables are defined whether the target is 
acquired with stock, combination of cash and stock, other than cash and stock, and unknown type of payment.  Other includes options, warrants, rights, or 
combination of them.  The remainders of the dummy variables are the relative size of target which is the ratio of market values of merging firms.   
   
 
[ -2 , 1 ]  [ -3 , 1 ] 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Merger Preparation          
Dummy = 1 
if MPI 
0.012 
(1.88*) 
0.008 
(1.29) 
0.010 
(1.43) 
0.006 
(0.96) 
 
0.011 
(1.67*) 
0.007 
(1.08) 
0.009 
(1.25) 
0.005 
(0.76) 
Dummy = 1 
if MPO 
0.019 
(2.69***) 
0.015 
(2.14**) 
0.016 
(2.14**) 
0.012 
(1.68*) 
 
0.022 
(3.01***) 
0.018 
(2.47**) 
0.019 
(2.45**) 
0.016 
(2.00**) 
Dummy = 1 
if MPT 
-0.013 
(-2.03**) 
-0.007 
(-1.13) 
-0.012 
(-1.75*) 
-0.008 
(-1.20) 
 
-0.014 
(-1.99**) 
-0.008 
(-1.15) 
-0.011 
(-1.48) 
-0.007 
(-0.97) 
Method of Payment          
Dummy = 1 
If Stock 
 
-0.034 
(-5.56***) 
 
-0.035 
(-5.01***) 
  
-0.036 
(-5.53***) 
 
-0.032 
(-4.30***) 
Dummy = 1 
if Cash & Stock 
 
-0.033 
(-5.05***) 
 
-0.026 
(-2.00**) 
  
-0.032 
(-4.48***) 
 
-0.029 
(-2.10**) 
Dummy = 1 
if Other 
 
-0.023 
(-2.00**) 
 
-0.033 
(-5.23***) 
  
-0.024 
(-1.96**) 
 
-0.036 
(-5.27***) 
Dummy = 1 
if Unknown 
 
-0.022 
(-2.58***) 
 
-0.022 
(-2.30**) 
  
-0.020 
(-2.17**) 
 
-0.021 
(-1.98**) 
Relative Size of Target          
Dummy = 1 
if 10 ~ 9.99% 
  
-0.011 
(-1.83*) 
-0.005 
(-0.87) 
   
-0.012 
(-2.01**) 
-0.007 
(-1.16) 
Dummy = 1 
if 50  ~ 99.99 % 
  
-0.023 
(-2.30**) 
-0.016 
(-1.67*) 
   
-0.030 
(-2.85***) 
-0.024 
(-2.27**) 
Dummy = 1 
if ≥100% 
  
0.008 
(0.56) 
0.012 
(0.89) 
   
0.006 
(0.44) 
0.010 
(0.68) 
Intercept 
-0.017 
(-4.08***) 
0.004 
(0.74) 
-0.011 
(-2.25**) 
0.008 
(1.29) 
 
-0.018 
(-4.00***) 
0.003 
(0.59) 
-0.011 
(-2.09**) 
0.008 
(1.29) 
Adjusted    0.0220 0.0594 0.0326 0.0697  0.0230 0.0572 0.0357 0.0692 
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Table 13  
Interactions of Merger Preparations with Other Dummies  
 
Ordinary least squares regression of the bidding firms’ four-day and five-day cumulative abnormal returns on the following variables. First five 
dummy variables are defined as whether the target is acquired with cash, stock, combination of cash and stock, other than cash and stock, and 
unknown type of payment.  Other includes options, warrants, rights, or combination of them.  The remainders of the dummy variables are the 
relative size of target which is the ratio of market values of merging firms.  This table reports the interaction of each merger preparation with 
other dummies.  
   
 
[ -2 , 1 ]  [ -3 , 1 ] 
MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
 
MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Method of Payment          
Dummy=1 
If Cash 
0.0186 
(2.49**) 
0.0152 
(1.60) 
0.0434 
(2.93***) 
0.0207 
(2.38**) 
 
0.0198 
(2.44**) 
0.0118 
(1.13) 
0.0400 
(2.67***) 
0.0251 
(2.65***) 
Dummy = 1 
If Stock 
-0.0108 
(-1.22) 
-0.0349 
(-3.12***) 
0.0040 
(0.34) 
-0.0108 
(-1.29) 
 
-0.0210 
(-1.25) 
-0.0324 
(-2.65***) 
-0.0012 
(-0.10) 
-0.0145 
(-1.58) 
Dummy = 1 
if Cash & Stock 
-0.0306 
(-3.21***) 
-0.0139 
(-1.11) 
-0.0028 
(-0.23) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
 
-0.0282 
(-2.73***) 
0.0025 
(0.18) 
-0.0018 
(-0.15) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
Dummy = 1 
if Other 
0.0082 
(0.50) 
0.0277 
(1.29) 
-0.0294 
(-1.35) 
-0.0038 
(-0.19) 
 
0.0065 
(0.36) 
0.0056 
(0.24) 
-0.0217 
(-0.98) 
-0.0074 
(-0.34) 
Dummy = 1 
if Unknown 
0.0145 
(1.09) 
0.0059 
(0.37) 
-0.0151 
(-0.62) 
-0.0060 
(-0.50) 
 
0.0139 
(0.96) 
0.0125 
(0.72) 
-0.0153 
(-0.62) 
-0.0030 
(-0.23) 
Relative Size of Target          
Dummy = 1 
If ≤ 10% 
0.0051 
(0.59) 
-0.0313 
(-2.07**) 
-0.0024 
(-0.19) 
0.0134 
(1.58) 
 
0.0071 
(0.76) 
-0.0370 
(-2.23**) 
(0.72) 
0.0013 
(0.10) 
0.0186 
(2.01**) 
Dummy = 1 
if 10 ~ 9.99% 
0.0068 
(0.69) 
-0.0275 
(-1.73*) 
-0.0008 
(-0.08) 
-0.0017 
(-0.19) 
 
0.0089 
(0.83) 
-0.0346 
(-1.99**) 
0.0026 
(0.24) 
-0.0020 
(-0.20) 
Dummy = 1 
if 50  ~ 99.99 % 
-0.0355 
(-2.44**) 
-0.0708 
(-2.22**) 
-0.0027 
(-0.19) 
-0.0012 
(-0.09) 
 
-0.0363 
(-2.30**) 
-0.1006 
(-2.88***) 
-0.0098 
(-0.68) 
-0.0011 
(-0.08) 
Dummy = 1 
if ≥100% 
0.0236 
(1.33) 
0.1296 
(4.08***) 
0.0060 
(0.30) 
-0.0105 
(-0.59) 
 
0.0202 
(1.05) 
0.1723 
(4.95***) 
0.0059 
(0.29) 
-0.0156 
(-0.80) 
Intercept 
0.0101 
(-1.13) 
0.0316 
(2.05**) 
-0.0372 
(-3.48***) 
-0.0248 
(-2.98***) 
 
-0.0138 
(-1.42) 
0.0387 
(2.29***) 
-0.0380 
(-3.53***) 
-0.0288 
(-3.17***) 
Root MSE 0.0633 0.0683 0.0878 0.0757  0.0687 0.0748 0.0887 0.0827 
 58 
 
Table 14  
Interactions of Merger Preparations with Other Dummies (Multifactor Models) 
 
Ordinary least squares regression of the bidding firms’ four-day and five-day cumulative abnormal returns on the following variables. First 
three dummy variables are defined as whether the bidding firm conducted merger preparations.  The next four dummy variables are defined 
whether the target is acquired with stock, combination of cash and stock, other than cash and stock, and unknown type of payment.  Other 
includes options, warrants, rights, or combination of them.  The remainders of the dummy variables are the relative size of target which is the 
ratio of market values of merging firms.   
   
 
[ -2 , 1 ]  [ 3 , 1 ] 
MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
 
MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Method of Payment          
Dummy=1 
If Cash 
0.0128 
(1.80*) 
0.0109 
(1.11) 
0.0409 
(2.75***) 
0.0154 
(1.78*) 
 
0.0159 
(2.05**) 
0.00674 
(0.63) 
0.0370 
(2.46**) 
0.0191 
(2.02**) 
Dummy = 1 
If Stock 
-0.0093 
(-1.11) 
-0.0372 
(-3.24***) 
0.0035 
(0.30) 
-0.0153 
(-1.83*) 
 
-0.0099 
(-1.08) 
-0.0351 
(-2.83***) 
-0.0018 
(-0.15) 
-0.0196 
(-2.14**) 
Dummy = 1 
if Cash & Stock 
-0.0279 
(-3.08***) 
-0.0093 
(-0.73) 
-0.0036 
(-0.30) 
-0.0023 
(-0.23) 
 
-0.0298 
(-3.03***) 
0.0065 
(0.47) 
-0.0029 
(-0.23) 
-0.0027 
(-0.25) 
Dummy = 1 
if Other 
0.0163 
(1.03) 
0.0308 
(1.40) 
-0.0299 
(-1.36) 
0.0090 
(0.46) 
 
0.0153 
(0.90) 
0.0107 
(0.45) 
-0.0222 
(-1.00) 
0.0091 
(0.42) 
Dummy = 1 
if Unknown 
0.0081 
(0.64) 
0.0048 
(0.30) 
-0.0109 
(-0.44) 
-0.0068 
(-0.57) 
 
0.0085 
(0.62) 
0.0113 
(0.64) 
-0.0101 
(-0.41) 
-0.0059 
(-0.46) 
Relative Size of Target          
Dummy = 1 
If ≤ 10% 
0.0055 
(0.67) 
-0.0289 
(-1.86*) 
-0.0014 
(-0.11) 
0.0144 
(1.70*) 
 
0.0077 
(0.86) 
-0.0346 
(-2.06**) 
0.0027 
(0.21) 
0.0193 
(2.09**) 
Dummy = 1 
if 10 ~ 9.99% 
0.0031 
(0.33) 
-0.0264 
(-1.61) 
-0.0012 
(-0.11) 
-0.0044 
(-0.50) 
 
0.0067 
(0.65) 
-0.0329 
(-1.87*) 
0.0021 
(0.20) 
-0.0053 
(-0.54) 
Dummy = 1 
if 50  ~ 99.99 % 
-0.0320 
(-2.31**) 
-0.0729 
(-2.22**) 
-0.0030 
(-0.21) 
0.0050 
(0.39) 
 
-0.0282 
(-1.87*) 
-0.1024 
(-2.89***) 
-0.0101 
(-0.70) 
0.0040 
(0.28) 
Dummy = 1 
if ≥100% 
0.0233 
(1.38) 
0.1282 
(3.93***) 
0.0055 
(0.27) 
-0.0150 
(-0.85) 
 
0.0139 
(0.75) 
0.1700 
(4.82***) 
0.0053 
(0.26) 
-0.0180 
(-0.93) 
Intercept 
-0.0083 
(-0.97) 
0.0330 
(2.09**) 
-0.0364 
(-3.39***) 
-0.0190 
(-2.31**) 
 
-0.0126 
(-1.36) 
0.0406 
(2.38**) 
-0.0370 
(-3.42***) 
-0.0213 
(-2.35**) 
Root MSE 0.0601 0.0701 0.0883 0.0754  0.0654 0.0758 0.0890 0.0825 
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Table A.1 
The Number of Mergers Available in Each Year (1) 
 
I collect 995 mergers at random which were successfully completed between January 1, 1996 and March 31, 2007 from Business 
Wire and PR Newswire in Lexis-Nexis Academic and Thomson ONE Banker.  By comparing merger samples, I filter out the cases 
which are included in both data sources.  To exclude rumor effects on the returns of bidding firms, I select the mergers which were 
announced with the terms such as finished, completed, or finalized.  Both of bidding and target firms are publicly traded on the 
AMEX, Nasdaq, or NYSE. 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Business Wire &  PR Newswire 39 40 31 31 33 43 29 29 36 37 30 12 390 
Thomson One Bankers 44 79 75 75 40 48 32 69 75 24 41 3 605 
Total Available Mergers 83 119 106 106 73 91 61 98 111 61 71 15 995 
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Table A.2 
The Number of Mergers Available in Each Year (2) 
 
I collect total 26063 mergers from Business Wire and PR Newswire in Lexis-Nexis Academic and Thomson ONE Banker.  Firstly, I 
narrow down the sample size, by subtracting the mergers where the bidding firm is not publicly traded.  Secondly, I exclude the 
mergers additionally if appropriate proxy statements are not searchable in the S.E.C. website. 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Total Mergers 1438 1915 2367 2869 2993 2367 1988 1982 2319 2476 2642 707 26063 
Not Publicly Traded Merging Firms 1278 1742 2195 2729 2882 2251 1891 1847 2169 2365 2554 687 24590 
No Proxy Statements 77 54 66 34 38 25 36 37 39 50 17 5 478 
Total Available Mergers 83 119 106 106 73 91 61 98 111 61 71 15 995 
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Table A.3 
The Types of Merger Preparations and the Number of Mergers Available in Each Year 
 
I define merger preparations as bidding firms’ adaptive actions of changing executives prior to merger.  To identify merger 
preparations, I look up two proxy statements such as Form-10K and Form-14A which are filed for U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commissions (S.E.C).  In case that bidding firms make multi-merger preparations, I select out the most critical merger preparation 
by following consistent criteria. 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
MPI 23 31 28 35 21 18 14 19 28 20 21 6 264 
MPO 11 19 16 26 14 20 10 24 22 8 12 4 186 
MPT 10 20 25 16 13 17 10 25 35 21 22 2 216 
NOMP 39 49 37 29 25 36 27 30 26 12 16 3 329 
 
MPI: the movements or job title changes of existing executives in the bidding firms. 
MPO: the hiring of new executives by bidding firms from outside other than the targets. 
MPT: the hiring of new executives by bidding firms from the targets. 
NOMP: no movements or changes of the executives in bidding firms. 
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Table A.4 
Merger with Merger Preparations vs. Mergers without Merger Preparation 
 
I define merger preparations as bidding firms’ adaptive actions of changing executives prior to merger.  To identify merger 
preparations, I look up two proxy statements such as Form-10K and Form-14A which are filed for U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commissions (S.E.C).  In case that bidding firms make multi-merger preparations, I select out the most critical merger 
preparation by following consistent criteria. 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Mergers with Merger Preparation 44 70 69 77 48 55 34 68 85 49 55 12 666 
No Merger Preparation 39 49 37 29 25 36 27 30 26 12 16 3 329 
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Table A.5 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Bidding Firms in Each Merger Preparation 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms that conducted merger preparations and no merger 
preparation during 12-year period between Jan, 1996 and Mar, 2007.  Cumulative abnormal returns 
are calculated for the two days [-1, 0] and [0, 1], and three days [-1, 1] around the announcement 
(day 0) of a merger.  Abnormal returns are estimated using a simple market model: 
           ̂     ̂    
 where    is the return on firm   and   is the value-weighted market index return. The abnormal 
return is the disturbance term of the market model.   All bidding and target firms are publicly 
traded firms listed on the NYSE, Nasdaq, or AMEX. 
 
 MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 0] 
-0.0046 
(264, -2.20**) 
0.0051 
(186, 1.73*) 
-0.0227 
(217, -8.02***) 
-0.0001 
(329, -0.20) 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[0, 1] 
-0.0034 
(264, -1.64) 
-0.0023 
(186, -0.78) 
-0.0291 
(217, -
10.30***) 
-0.0169 
(329, -5.88***) 
Three-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 1] 
-0.0056 
(264, -2.17**) 
0.0030 
(186, 0.82) 
-0.0310 
(217, -8.94***) 
-0.0203 
(329, -5.78***) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
 
Table Entry is:  
Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(Number of Events, Test Statistic for Significance of Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns) 
MPI denotes the movement or job title changes among existing executives in bidding firms. 
MPO denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms from outside except target. 
MPT denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms directly from target. 
NOMP denotes no changes on the executives’ roster and their titles in bidding firms. 
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Table A.6 
Sign Test on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Sign test is based on the sign of cumulative abnormal returns.  This sign test requires that 
cumulative abnormal returns are independent across bidding firms and that the expected proportion 
of positive abnormal returns under the null hypothesis is 0.5.  Test statistic is  
 
  [
  
 
      ]
√ 
   
   (    ) 
where  is the number of merger which has positive CARs and   is the total number of mergers.   
 
 MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 0] 
-1.969** 
(116, 148) 
1.320 
(102, 84) 
-2.994*** 
(86, 130) 
-2.040** 
(146, 183) 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[0, 1] 
-0.246 
(130, 134) 
-1.027 
(86, 100) 
-6.532*** 
(60, 156) 
-1.378 
(152, 177) 
Three-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 1] 
-1.723* 
(118, 146) 
1.320 
(102,84) 
-5.035*** 
(71,145) 
-1.709* 
(149,180) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
       
      Table Entry is:  
      Test Statistics 
      (Number of Positive CARs, Number of Negative CARs) 
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Table A.7 
The Effect of Merger Preparations in the Six Months Prior to Merger Announcement 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms that conducted merger preparations and no merger 
preparation during 12-year period between Jan, 1996 and Mar, 2007.  Cumulative abnormal returns 
are calculated for the two days [-1, 0] and [0, 1] and three days [-1, 1] around the announcement 
(day 0) of a merger.  Abnormal returns are estimated using a simple market model: 
           ̂     ̂    
 where    is the return on firm   and   is the value-weighted market index return.  These analyses 
on merger preparations are focused on the cases that occurred in the six months prior to merger 
announcement. 
 
 MPI MPO MPT 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 0] 
-0.0056 
(111, -1.61) 
0.0054 
(70, 1.11) 
-0.0236 
(153, -6.58***) 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[0, 1] 
-0.0072 
(111, -2.18**) 
-0.0043 
(70, -0.87) 
-0.0314 
(153, -8.75***) 
Three-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 1] 
-0.0097 
(111, -2.41**) 
0.0028 
(70, 0.47) 
-0.0332 
(153, -7.55***) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
 
Table Entry is:  
Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(Number of Events, Test Statistic for Significance of Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns) 
MPI denotes the movement or job title changes among existing executives in bidding firms. 
MPO denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms from outside except target. 
MPT denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms directly from target. 
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Table A.8 
Sign Test on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(The Effect of Merger Preparations in the Six Months Prior to Merger Announcement) 
 
Sign test is based on the sign of cumulative abnormal returns.  This sign test requires that 
cumulative abnormal returns are independent across bidding firms and that the expected proportion 
of positive abnormal returns under the null hypothesis is 0.5.  Test statistic is  
 
  [
  
 
      ]
√ 
   
   (    ) 
where  is the number of merger which has positive CARs and   is the total number of mergers.  
These analyses on merger preparations are focused on the cases that occurred in the six months 
prior to merger announcement.   
 
 MPI MPO MPT 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 0] 
-0.095 
(55, 56) 
0.239 
(36, 34) 
-3.153*** 
(57, 96) 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[0, 1] 
0.095 
(56, 55) 
-1.195 
(30, 40) 
-4.932*** 
(46, 107) 
Three-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 1] 
0.285 
(57, 54) 
0.717 
(38,32) 
-4.447*** 
(49,104) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
       
      Table Entry is:  
      Test Statistics 
      (Number of Positive CARs, Number of Negative CARs) 
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Table A.9 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Bidding Firms in Each Merger Preparation 
(Multifactor Models) 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms that conducted merger preparations and no merger 
preparation during 12-year period between Jan, 1996 and Mar, 2007.  Cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated for the four days [-2, 1] and five days [-3, 1] around the announcement (day 0) of a merger.  
Abnormal returns are estimated using a multi-factor market model by Fama-French (1993) or Carhart 
(1997): 
            (     )                           
 where    is the return on firm  ,   is the value-weighted market index return,   is the risk free rate, 
SMB is the difference between the return on the portfolio of “small” and “big” stocks, HML is the 
difference between the return on the portfolio of “high” and “low” book-to-market stocks, and UMD is 
the difference between the return on the portfolio of past one-year “winners” and “losers”.    
 
 MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 0] 
-0.0009 
(264, -0.44) 
0.0029 
(186, 1.16) 
-0.0228 
(217, -8.31***) 
-0.0083 
(329, -3.85***) 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[0, 1] 
-0.0040 
(264, -2.00**) 
-0.0023 
(186, -0.92) 
-0.0292 
(217, -
10.66***) 
-0.0115 
(329, -5.36***) 
Three-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 1] 
-0.0053 
(264, -2.15**) 
0.0002 
(186, 0.05) 
-0.0312 
(217, -9.26***) 
-0.0137 
(329, -5.21***) 
Four-Day of Event Window 
[-2, 1] 
-0.0053 
(264, -1.86*) 
0.0007 
(186, 0.20) 
-0.0306 
(217, -7.85***) 
-0.0142 
(329, -4.66***) 
Five-Day of Event Window 
[-3, 1] 
-0.0065 
(264, -2.04**) 
0.0030 
(186, 0.77) 
-0.0320 
(217, -7.33***) 
-0.0142 
(329, -4.15***) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
 
Table Entry is:  
Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(Number of Events, Test Statistic for Significance of Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns) 
MPI denotes the movement or job title changes among existing executives in bidding firms. 
MPO denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms from outside except target. 
MPT denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms directly from target. 
NOMP denotes no changes on the executives’ roster and their titles in bidding firms. 
  
 68 
 
Table A.10 
Sign Test on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(Multifactor Models) 
 
Sign test is based on the sign of cumulative abnormal returns.  This sign test requires that cumulative 
abnormal returns are independent across bidding firms and that the expected proportion of positive 
abnormal returns under the null hypothesis is 0.5.  Test statistic is  
 
  [
  
 
      ]
√ 
   
   (    ) 
where  is the number of merger which has positive CARs and   is the total number of mergers.   
 
 MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 0] 
-1.231 
(122, 142) 
1.320 
(102, 84) 
-3.402*** 
(83, 133) 
-3.032*** 
(137, 192) 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[0, 1] 
-0.615 
(127, 137) 
-0.440 
(90, 96) 
-6.260*** 
(62, 154) 
-3.694*** 
(131, 198) 
Three-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 1] 
-1.108 
(123, 141) 
1.613 
(104,82) 
-5.443*** 
(68, 148) 
-3.473*** 
(133,196) 
Four-Day of Event Window 
[-2, 1] 
-0.739 
(126, 138) 
1.320 
(102,84) 
-5.171*** 
(70, 146) 
-2.701*** 
(140,189) 
Five-Day of Event Window 
[-3, 1] 
0 
(124, 140) 
1.027 
(100,86) 
-5.443*** 
(68, 148) 
-2.260** 
(144,185) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
       
      Table Entry is:  
      Test Statistics 
      (Number of Positive CARs, Number of Negative CARs) 
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Table A.11 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Bidding Firms in Each Merger Preparation 
(Multifactor Models for Merger Preparations in the Six months prior to Merger Announcement) 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms that conducted merger preparations and no merger 
preparation during 12-year period between Jan, 1996 and Mar, 2007.  Cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated for the two days [-1, 0] and [0, 1] and three days [-1, 1] around the announcement (day 0) of a 
merger.  Abnormal returns are estimated using a multi-factor market model by Fama-French (1993) or 
Carhart (1997): 
            (     )                           
 where    is the return on firm  ,   is the value-weighted market index return,   is the risk free rate, 
SMB is the difference between the return on the portfolio of “small” and “big” stocks, HML is the 
difference between the return on the portfolio of “high” and “low” book-to-market stocks, and UMD is 
the difference between the return on the portfolio of past one-year “winners” and “losers”.  These 
analyses on merger preparations are focused on the cases that occurred in the six months prior to merger 
announcement.      
 
 MPI MPO MPT 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 0] 
-0.0035 
(111, -1.04) 
0.0068 
(70, 1.43) 
-0.0235 
(153, -6.68***) 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[0, 1] 
-0.0069 
(111, -2.07**) 
-0.0022 
(70, -0.46) 
-0.0313 
(153, -8.91***) 
Three-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 1] 
-0.0082 
(111, -1.98**) 
0.0051 
(70, 0.87) 
-0.0330 
(153, -7.66***) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
 
Table Entry is:  
Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(Number of Events, Test Statistic for Significance of Aggregate Cumulative Abnormal Returns) 
MPI denotes the movement or job title changes among existing executives in bidding firms. 
MPO denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms from outside except target. 
MPT denotes the hiring of new executives by bidding firms directly from target. 
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Table A.12 
Sign Test on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Multifactor Models 
(The Effect of Merger Preparations in the Six Months prior to Merger Announcement) 
 
Sign test is based on the sign of cumulative abnormal returns.  This sign test requires that cumulative 
abnormal returns are independent across bidding firms and that the expected proportion of positive 
abnormal returns under the null hypothesis is 0.5.  Test statistic is  
 
  [
  
 
      ]
√ 
   
   (    ) 
where  is the number of merger which has positive CARs and   is the total number of mergers.  These 
analyses on merger preparations are focused on the cases that occurred in the six months prior to merger 
announcement.      
 
 
 MPI MPO MPT 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 0] 
-0.095 
(55, 56) 
0.239 
(36, 34) 
-3.153*** 
(57, 96) 
Two-Day of Event Window 
[0, 1] 
0.095 
(56, 55) 
-1.195 
(30, 46) 
-4.932*** 
(46, 107) 
Three-Day of Event Window 
[-1, 1] 
0.285 
(57, 54) 
0.717 
(38, 32) 
-4.447*** 
(49, 104) 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
       
      Table Entry is:  
      Test Statistics 
      (Number of Positive CARs, Number of Negative CARs) 
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Table A.13  
Interactions of Merger Preparations with Other Dummies  
 
Ordinary least squares regression of the bidding firms’ two-day cumulative abnormal returns on the following variables. First five dummy 
variables are defined as whether the target is acquired with cash, stock, combination of cash and stock, other than cash and stock, and unknown 
type of payment.  Other includes options, warrants, rights, or combination of them.  The remainders of the dummy variables are the relative size 
of target which is the ratio of market values of merging firms.  This table reports the interaction of each merger preparation with other dummies.  
   
 
[ -1 , 0 ]  [ 0 , 1 ] 
MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
 
MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Method of Payment          
Dummy=1 
If Cash 
0.0029 
(0.50) 
0.0143 
(1.91*) 
0.0201 
(1.68*) 
0.0005 
(0.38) 
 
0.0150 
(2.15**) 
0.0193 
(2.22**) 
0.0369 
(2.77***) 
0.0024 
(1.26) 
Dummy = 1 
If Stock 
-0.0158 
(-2.34**) 
-0.0190 
(-2.17**) 
-0.0038 
(-0.40) 
-0.0003 
(-0.27) 
 
-0.0106 
(-1.29) 
-0.0291 
(-2.86***) 
-0.0081 
(-0.77) 
0.0032 
(1.75*) 
Dummy = 1 
if Cash & Stock 
-0.0193 
(-2.66***) 
-0.0260 
(-2.65***) 
-0.0057 
(-0.59) 
-0.0028 
(-2.02**) 
 
-0.0305 
(-3.43***) 
-0.0167 
(-1.46) 
-0.0048 
(-0.44) 
-0.0033 
(-1.52) 
Dummy = 1 
if Other 
0.0191 
(1.51) 
0.0177 
(1.05) 
-0.0179 
(-1.01) 
0.0001 
(0.03) 
 
0.0109 
(0.71) 
0.0136 
(0.70) 
-0.0222 
(-1.13) 
-0.0033 
(-0.76) 
Dummy = 1 
if Unknown 
0.0132 
(1.30) 
0.0130 
(1.04) 
0.0073 
(0.37) 
0.0025 
(1.53) 
 
0.0151 
(1.22) 
0.0129 
(0.89) 
-0.0018 
(-0.08) 
0.0010 
(0.36) 
Relative Size of Target          
Dummy = 1 
If ≤ 10% 
0.0140 
(2.12**) 
-0.0209 
(-1.76*) 
-0.0003 
(-0.03) 
0.0012 
(1.05) 
 
0.0052 
(0.65) 
-0.0252 
(-1.83*) 
0.0030 
(0.26) 
-0.0030 
(-1.58) 
Dummy = 1 
if 10 ~ 9.99% 
0.0077 
(1.02) 
-0.0159 
(-1.28) 
-0.0000 
(-0.00) 
-0.0011 
(-0.85) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
-0.0324 
(-2.23**) 
0.0012 
(0.13) 
-0.0040 
(-2.02**) 
Dummy = 1 
if 50  ~ 99.99 % 
-0.0226 
(-2.03**) 
-0.0280 
(-1.12) 
-0.0111 
(-0.97) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
 
-0.0292 
(-2.15**) 
-0.0545 
(-1.87*) 
-0.0132 
(-1.03) 
0.0101 
(3.55***) 
Dummy = 1 
if ≥100% 
0.0009 
(0.006) 
0.0648 
(2.60***) 
0.0114 
(0.71) 
-0.0001 
(-0.06) 
 
0.0241 
(1.45) 
0.1121 
(3.87***) 
0.0090 
(0.50) 
-0.0032 
(-0.81) 
Intercept 
-0.0109 
(-1.60) 
0.0225 
(1.87*) 
-0.0218 
(-2.53**) 
-0.0002 
(-0.20) 
 
-0.0073 
(-0.87) 
0.0215 
(1.54) 
-0.0307 
(-3.20***) 
0.0019 
(1.06) 
Root MSE 0.0482 0.0535 0.0709 0.0105  0.0591 0.0622 0.0789 0.0167 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table A.13 (Continued) 
Interactions of Merger Preparations with Other Dummies  
 
Ordinary least squares regression of the bidding firms’ three-day cumulative abnormal returns on the 
following variables. First five dummy variables are defined as whether the target is acquired with cash, 
stock, combination of cash and stock, other than cash and stock, and unknown type of payment.  Other 
includes options, warrants, rights, or combination of them.  The remainders of the dummy variables are 
the relative size of target which is the ratio of market values of merging firms.  This table reports the 
interaction of each merger preparation with other dummies.  
   
 
[ -1 , 1 ] 
MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Method of Payment     
Dummy=1 
If Cash 
0.0168 
(2.17**) 
0.0203 
(2.15**) 
0.0378 
(2.67***) 
0.0027 
(1.31) 
Dummy = 1 
If Stock 
-0.0138 
(-1.51) 
-0.0352 
(-3.18***) 
-0.0036 
(-0.32) 
0.0034 
(1.74*) 
Dummy = 1 
if Cash & Stock 
-0.0347 
(-3.52***) 
-0.0239 
(-1.93*) 
-0.0074 
(-0.64) 
-0.0047 
(-2.01**) 
Dummy = 1 
if Other 
0.0154 
(0.90) 
0.0297 
(1.40) 
-0.0232 
(-1.11) 
-0.0045 
(-0.97) 
Dummy = 1 
if Unknown 
0.0162 
(1.18) 
0.0090 
(0.57) 
-0.0037 
(-0.16) 
0.0031 
(1.09) 
Relative Size of Target     
Dummy = 1 
If ≤ 10% 
0.0043 
(0.48) 
-0.0337 
(-2.25**) 
0.0009 
(0.08) 
-0.0027 
(-1.37) 
Dummy = 1 
if 10 ~ 9.99% 
0.0021 
(0.21) 
-0.0357 
(-2.26**) 
0.0036 
(0.36) 
-0.0045 
(-2.14**) 
Dummy = 1 
if 50  ~ 99.99 % 
-0.0352 
(-2.34) 
-0.0634 
(-2.00**) 
-0.0125 
(-0.92) 
0.0101 
(3.32***) 
Dummy = 1 
if ≥100% 
0.0287 
(1.56) 
0.1328 
(4.22***) 
0.0080 
(0.42) 
-0.0028 
(-0.68) 
Intercept 
-0.0083 
(-0.90) 
0.0350 
(2.30**) 
-0.0348 
(-3.41***) 
0.0017 
(0.86) 
Root MSE 0.0654 0.0677 0.0839 0.0178 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table A.14  
Interactions of Merger Preparations with Other Dummies (Multifactor Models) 
 
Ordinary least squares regression of the bidding firms’ two-day cumulative abnormal returns on the following variables. First three dummy 
variables are defined as whether the bidding firm conducted merger preparations.  The next four dummy variables are defined whether the 
target is acquired with stock, combination of cash and stock, other than cash and stock, and unknown type of payment.  Other includes options, 
warrants, rights, or combination of them.  The remainders of the dummy variables are the relative size of target which is the ratio of market 
values of merging firms.   
   
[ -1 , 0 ]  [ 0 , 1 ] 
MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
 
MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Method of Payment          
Dummy=1 
If Cash 
0.0016 
(0.31) 
0.0119 
(1.56) 
0.0189 
(1.57) 
0.0143 
(2.26**) 
 
0.0071 
(1.12) 
0.0166 
(1.87*) 
0.0356 
(2.68***) 
0.0104 
(1.44) 
Dummy = 1 
If Stock 
-0.0102 
(-1.68*) 
-0.0203 
(-2.29**) 
-0.0041 
(-0.43) 
-0.0091 
(-1.48) 
 
-0.0113 
(-1.50) 
-0.0306 
(-2.95***) 
-0.0083 
(-0.78) 
-0.0055 
(-0.78) 
Dummy = 1 
if Cash & Stock 
-0.0168 
(-2.56**) 
-0.0233 
(-2.34**) 
-0.0062 
(-0.63) 
0.0047 
(0.65) 
 
-0.0271 
(-3.35***) 
-0.0127 
(-1.09) 
-0.0051 
(-0.47) 
-0.0034 
(-0.41) 
Dummy = 1 
if Other 
0.0193 
(1.69*) 
0.0196 
(1.15) 
-0.0181 
(-1.02) 
-0.0067 
(-0.47) 
 
0.0222 
(1.58) 
0.0146 
(0.73) 
-0.0227 
(-1.15) 
-0.0093 
(-0.56) 
Dummy = 1 
if Unknown 
0.0062 
(0.67) 
0.0122 
(0.96) 
0.0095 
(0.48) 
-0.0033 
(-0.37) 
 
0.0090 
(0.80) 
0.0121 
(0.82) 
0.0004 
(0.02) 
0.0077 
(0.77) 
Relative Size of Target          
Dummy = 1 
If ≤ 10% 
0.0086 
(1.44) 
-0.0196 
(-1.63) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
0.0011 
(0.18) 
 
0.0031 
(0.43) 
-0.0233 
(-1.66*) 
0.0036 
(0.31) 
0.0050 
(0.70) 
Dummy = 1 
if 10 ~ 9.99% 
0.0018 
(0.27) 
-0.0153 
(-1.21) 
-0.0002 
(-0.02) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
 
-0.0059 
(-0.70) 
-0.0320 
(-2.16**) 
0.0011 
(0.11) 
-0.0095 
(-1.28) 
Dummy = 1 
if 50  ~ 99.99 % 
-0.0058 
(-0.57) 
-0.0293 
(-1.15) 
-0.0112 
(-0.97) 
0.0163 
(1.72*) 
 
-0.0341 
(-2.76***) 
-0.0565 
(-1.90*) 
-0.0135 
(-1.05) 
0.0027 
(0.25) 
Dummy = 1 
if ≥100% 
-0.0047 
(-0.38) 
0.0642 
(2.54**) 
0.0112 
(0.69) 
-0.0174 
(-1.34) 
 
0.0368 
(2.44**) 
0.1117 
(3.78***) 
0.0088 
(0.49) 
0.0019 
(0.13) 
Intercept 
-0.0051 
(-0.82) 
0.0234 
(1.91*) 
-0.0214 
(-2.48**) 
-0.0109 
(-1.80*) 
 
-0.0028 
(-0.36) 
0.0222 
(1.55) 
-0.0304 
(-3.17***) 
-0.0122 
(-1.76*) 
Root MSE 0.0439 0.0544 0.0711 0.0554  0.0537 0.0635 0.0789 0.0631 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level     
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Table A.14 (Continued) 
Interactions of Merger Preparations with Other Dummies (Multifactor Models) 
 
Ordinary least squares regression of the bidding firms’ three-day cumulative abnormal returns on the 
following variables. First three dummy variables are defined as whether the bidding firm conducted 
merger preparations.  The next four dummy variables are defined whether the target is acquired with 
stock, combination of cash and stock, other than cash and stock, and unknown type of payment.  Other 
includes options, warrants, rights, or combination of them.  The remainders of the dummy variables are 
the relative size of target which is the ratio of market values of merging firms.   
   
 
[ -1 , 1 ] 
MPI MPO MPT NOMP 
Method of Payment     
Dummy=1 
If Cash 
0.0099 
(1.39) 
0.0167 
(1.73*) 
0.0360 
(2.54**) 
0.0162 
(1.96**) 
Dummy = 1 
If Stock 
-0.0126 
(-1.49) 
-0.0371 
(-3.28***) 
-0.0040 
(-0.36) 
-0.0117 
(-1.46) 
Dummy = 1 
if Cash & Stock 
-0.0298 
(-3.26***) 
-0.0194 
(-1.53) 
-0.0080 
(-0.69) 
-0.0012 
(-0.12) 
Dummy = 1 
if Other 
0.0246 
(1.55) 
0.0318 
(1.47) 
-0.0236 
(-1.13) 
0.0009 
(-0.05) 
Dummy = 1 
if Unknown 
0.0078 
(0.61) 
0.0080 
(0.50) 
-0.0004 
(-0.02) 
-0.0025 
(-0.22) 
Relative Size of Target     
Dummy = 1 
If ≤ 10% 
0.0063 
(0.76) 
-0.0314 
(-2.05**) 
0.0017 
(0.14) 
0.0070 
(0.86) 
Dummy = 1 
if 10 ~ 9.99% 
0.0015 
(0.16) 
-0.0349 
(-2.17**) 
0.0034 
(0.34) 
-0.0056 
(-0.66) 
Dummy = 1 
if 50  ~ 99.99 % 
-0.0354 
(-2.54**) 
-0.0656 
(-2.03**) 
-0.0127 
(-0.94) 
0.0084 
(0.68) 
Dummy = 1 
if ≥100% 
0.0276 
(1.62) 
0.1319 
(4.10***) 
0.0076 
(0.40) 
-0.0097 
(-0.57) 
Intercept 
-0.0075 
(-0.88) 
0.0361 
(4.10***) 
-0.0342 
(-3.36***) 
-0.0161 
(-2.04**) 
Root MSE 0.0606 0.0692 0.0839 0.0721 
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Merger and the turnover of CEOs and CFOs are interpreted as organizational changes. The 
former is the integration of two separate organizations and the latter is the reorganization inside 
of a firm. By focusing on three financial policy variables such as financial leverage, cash 
holdings, and debt maturity structure, I conduct a comprehensive analysis on the organizational 
changes of a firm and examine the effects of CEO and CFO turnover on the corporate financial 
policy.  The results of this analysis show that (1) new CEOs who come from outside take riskier 
financial leverage policy immediately after a merger, (2) new CFOs who come from outside 
increase long-term debt to total debt ratio and offset the financial risk incurred by new CEOs, (3) 
in the follow-up adjustment period, the new CEOs who come from outside increase cash 
holdings, (4) a firm determines its financial policies by considering how the merger is evaluated 
in the market. 
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1. Introduction 
 A large literature analyzes the causal relationship between managerial performance of top 
executives and their turnover rates.  The literature also examines the effects of firm-specific 
factors on corporate financial policies.  However, we know little about how a firm’s 
organizational changes are connected to the choice of its financial policies.  I extend the 
literature and provide empirical evidences for systematical connections of a firm’s financial 
policies to its organizational changes.  As primary organizational changes, I introduce two 
corporate events into the study: corporate mergers and the turnovers of CEOs and CFOs.   From 
the corporate organizational point of view, a merger is interpreted as an integration of two 
separate organizations, and the turnovers of CEOs and CFOs are understood as reorganizations 
inside of a firm.  As a step towards learning more about a firm’s organizational changes and their 
effects on the choice of its financial policies, I focus on primarily those cases when a firm 
conducts a merger with new CEOs or CFOs.   
 While managerial decisions are made in teams, CEOs and CFOs are involved in different 
aspects of the corporate financial decision-making process.  CEOs are concerned with the 
broader aspects of financial decisions such as financial leverage and cash holdings.  In contrast, 
CFOs are involved in the finer aspects of the firm such as the debt maturity structure and the 
management of accruals.  The choices of a firm’s financial policies also are found to reflect the 
risk preference of CEOs and CFOs of the firm (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010).  Furthermore, 
the origin of new CEOs and CFOs has different implications for the firm’s policies (Agrawal, 
Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas, 2006; Chan, 1996; Friedman and Singh, 1989; Rosen 1986).  Those 
who come from outside are more likely to change the corporate strategy and mission, whereas 
those who come from inside are more likely to maintain stability and continuity of the firm.  To 
2 
 
capture more precisely the effects of CEO and CFO turnover, I categorize them based on their 
origin
1
 as well as their title. 
 Since turnovers of CEOs and CFOs are about reorganizations which take place within a 
firm, I use cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to reflect the effect of a merger which is the 
integration of two separate organizations.  It is natural that a firm determines its financial policies 
considering the market’s response to the merger, since CAR shows how the market evaluates a 
merger.  The firm is expected to take riskier financial policies when the merger is considered 
favorably in the market and the reverse is expected when the merger is considered negatively.   
 The basic hypotheses of this study are: 1) a firm changes its financial policies depending 
on how the market evaluates the merger; 2) choice of financial policies varies with turnovers of 
CEOs and CFOs occurring before a merger; 3) the turnover effects differ depending on the origin 
of the new CEOs and CFOs.    To test these predictions, I compute three financial variables such 
as financial leverage, cash holdings, and debt maturity structure using quarterly data and employ 
them as the firm’s main financial policy variables.  These variables make it possible to link a 
firm’s attitude toward financial risk with the change in corporate financial policies.  Higher 
leverage, lower cash holdings, and lower long-term debt to total debt ratio are regarded as riskier 
policy choices.  Additionally, I examine the influence of firm-specific factors by including the 
method of payment and the relative size of target in the analysis. 
 By comparing the values of three financial variables for two consecutive quarters, I 
examine a firm’s immediate responses to its organizational changes and inspect the firm’s 
follow-up adjustments in the following quarter.  First, I find significant relationship of turnover 
                                                        
1
 The new CEOs or CFOs who come from inside are those who fill the positions through vertical or horizontal 
movement in the bidding firm.  The new CEOs or CFOs who come from outside are those who fill the positions 
through external hire. 
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of CEOs with two financial variables, financial leverage and cash holdings.  New CEOs 
immediately increase the firm’s financial leverage in the quarter that a merger is completed.  
This immediate increase of financial leverage is driven by new CEOs who come from outside in 
particular.  The turnover effect of CEOs, however, is found not to be significant in the follow-up 
adjustment period.  Just like a financial leverage, the new CEOs who come from outside increase 
cash holdings as well.  However, this increase of cash holdings occurs in the follow-up 
adjustment stage.  These findings imply that the CEOs make an immediate choice of financial 
policies with an understanding of what future choices they plan to make next.  While new CEOs 
choose financially riskier policy by raising financial leverage, they take safety measures in the 
following quarter by increasing cash holdings. 
 Secondly, I find a significant relationship between the turnover of CFOs and a firm’s debt 
maturity structure.  New CFOs make immediate choices of increasing long-term debt to total 
debt ratio in the quarter that a merger is completed.  This immediate increase is driven especially 
by the CFOs who come from outside.  While new CEOs who come from inside are found to 
decrease the debt ratio, turnover effect of CFOs is found more influential in the choice of debt 
maturity policy.   Turnover effect of CFOs is found significant regardless of controls.  In the 
follow-up adjustment period, no significant effect on debt maturity is found in any type of 
turnovers.  Considering the changes in financial leverage resulting from the CEO turnovers 
together, I interpret this finding as the collaboration between CEOs and CFOs for the 
management of a firm’s financial risk.  Responding to the immediate increase of financial 
leverage conducted by new CEOs, new CFOs simultaneously increase long-term debt to total 
debt ratio as a way of offsetting financial risk incurred by the choice of new CEOs.     
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 Thirdly, I find that the choice of financial policies is also related with how the market 
evaluates the merger.  When the merger is evaluated favorably in the market, the firm takes 
riskier policy of higher financial leverage.  Responding to this increased financial risk, the firm 
increases cash holdings simultaneously and then adjusts the debt maturity structure in the next 
quarter to offset the financial risk.  This finding implies that a firm has room to increase its 
borrowing for investment when the merger is considered beneficial.  However, the firm takes 
safety measures for the management of financial risk by adjusting other policy variables. 
 Lastly, I find that CEOs are involved in the broader aspects of financial decision-making, 
whereas CFOs are concerned with finer aspects even when they face comprehensive 
organizational changes in a firm.  This finding is consistent with previous literature on corporate 
financial policy. 
 This paper makes some contributions to the empirical literature concerned with financial 
economics.  Firstly, it is a comprehensive analysis on the organizational changes of a firm to 
examine how turnovers of CEOs and CFOs influence corporate financial policies around the 
time of a merger.  The second contribution of this study is to include turnover of CFOs explicitly 
in the analysis.  Even if there has been acknowledgement regarding the involvement of CFOs, 
little research has been conducted to investigate turnover effects of CFOs on the choice of 
corporate financial policy.  Since corporate decisions are often made in teams (Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 2003), I incorporate both turnovers of CEOs and CFOs into the reorganization inside 
of a firm and analyze their effects on the choice of corporate financial policy.   
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 explains the merger data and 
control variables used in this study.  Section 3 describes the empirical analysis and reports its 
findings.  Section 4 concludes this paper. 
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2. Sample and Control Variables 
2.1.  Sample 
 Using Lexis-Nexis Academic and Thomson ONE Banker, I collected 995 mergers at 
random.  All these mergers were successfully completed between January 1, 1996 and March 31, 
2007.  I use variations and combinations of the words “mergers” and “acquisitions” as search 
terms and find 390 merger cases from Business Wire and PR Newswire in Lexis-Nexis 
Academic.  I find 615 additional mergers in a further search of Thomson ONE Banker by 
checking Custom League Tables in the M&A tab in the Deals Analysis menu.  First, I filter out 
the cases which are included in both data sources by comparing the samples.  Second, I select the 
cases in which both the bidding and target firms are publicly traded on the AMEX, Nasdaq, or 
NYSE.
2
  Lastly, I select 435 merger cases which involve turnover of CEOs and CFOs by 
inquiring into two proxy statements of Form-10K and Form DEF-14A
3
 that are filed with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Committee (S.E.C).   
 Table 1 reports how many turnovers of CEOs and CFOs are followed by mergers.  
Turnover of CFOs occurs more frequently than that of CEOs before a merger.  Turnovers of 
executives other than CEOs and CFOs are included in No Changes.  Table 2 shows the types of 
each turnover which is categorized by the origin of new CEOs and CFOs.  Although Hiring from 
Outside and Hiring from Target are separated in the table 2, I treat both as Hiring from Outside 
and examine its effect in the following regression analyses.  While the CEO positions are filled 
evenly by insiders and outsiders, the CFO positions are filled mainly by outsiders.  The one issue 
                                                        
2
 Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the number of mergers selected in each year. 
3
 Form 10K is an annual report to S.E.C and includes information such as company history, organizational structure, 
executives’ compensation, equity, subsidiaries, and audited financial statements.  Form DEF-14A is a definitive 
proxy statements and includes information on the date, time and place of the meeting of security holders, 
revocability of proxy, dissenter’s right of appraisal, persons making the solicitation, director or indirect  interest of 
certain persons in matters to be acted upon, modification or exchange of securities, financial statements, voting 
procedures and other details. 
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that occurs in the categorization is in the case that both CEO and CFO turnovers occur before a 
merger.  In particular, it is difficult to categorize turnovers based on the origin of new CEOs and 
CFOs if they have different origins.   This issue is found in 32 cases and I categorize them 
following the origin of the executive who receives higher compensation. 
 I take special care not to miss these turnovers.  Since CEO makes broad decisions, the 
changes of CEO and President are included in the CEO turnover.  I consider the CFO as any 
executive who holds the title of treasurer, finance, vice president-finance, and controller, since 
CFO is often titled with different name (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). 
 
2.2.  Control Variables 
 I use four control variables such as CAR in the merger announcement period, turnover of 
CEOs and CFOs, method of payment, and relative size of a target.  By dividing each variable 
into subcategories, I analyze in detail the causal relationships of corporate financial policies with 
these control variables.  Control variables in this study are described as follows.   
 
2.2.1.  Financial Variables 
 I conduct analysis on the financial policies by focusing on three important financial 
variables such as financial leverage, cash holdings, and debt maturity.  I incorporate these 
variables into the analysis because they are the ones extensively used in the field of corporate 
finance and accounting.  Furthermore, the analysis on these variables makes it possible to link a 
firm’s attitude toward financial risk with the change in corporate financial policy.  A firm’s 
financial decisions of higher leverage, lower cash holdings, and higher short-term debt to long-
term debt ratio are regarded as riskier policy choices, since they lead to an increase in the total 
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volatility of the firm’s earnings and consequently, its stock returns (Chava and Purnanandam, 
2010).  Comparing the choice of financial policies over time also makes it possible to capture a 
firm’s immediate response and follow-up adjustment from the management of financial risk 
perspectives.  In addition, this analysis also enables us to find differences, if any, in the choice of 
financial policy between new CEOs and new CFOs as well as between the new executives who 
come from either inside or outside.  I construct three corporate financial variables from quarterly 
Compustat data as follows.  
 
Financial Leverage
4
 
  I use book-leverage as a key variable.  It is constructed as the ratio of the sum of short-
term (DLC: item 34) and long-term debt (DLTT: item 9) to the book value of total assets (AT: 
item 6).  A firm’s choice of higher financial leverage increases the firm’s financial risk. 
 
Cash Holdings 
  I construct cash holdings as the ratio of cash and short-term investment (CHE: item 1) to 
the book value of total assets (AT: item 6) following Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2006) and Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999).  A firm’s decision to increase cash holdings will allow 
the firm to smooth its investment decision better by weakening their dependence on external 
funding (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993).  In addition, higher cash holdings reduce the 
financial risks of the firm. 
 
 
 
                                                        
4
 In the parenthesis next to Compustat data, I provide both of item name and item number.    
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Debt Maturity Structure 
 Following Barclay and Smith (1995), I broadly classify debt into short-term and long-
term debt depending on whether its maturity is less than three years.  Debt maturity structure is 
constructed as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt.  Long-term debt is the sum of debt due in 
the 4
th
 year (DD4, item 93) and debt due in the 5
th
 year (DD5, item 94) and total debt is the sum 
of long-term debt total (DLTT, item 9) and debt in current liability (DLC, item 34).  The 
decrease in the ratio of long-term debt will expose firms to considerable refinancing and interest 
rate risks as well as excess liquidation by the lenders (Diamond, 1991).  Therefore, a firm’s 
decision to decrease debt maturity increases the financial risks of the firm. 
 
2.2.2.  Turnover of CEOs and CFOs 
 Motivated by previous studies such as Chava and Purnanandam (2010), Murphy and 
Zabojnik (2007), Geiger and North (2006), Friedman and Singh (1989), Agrawal, Knoeber, and 
Tsoulouhas (2000), Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen (2000), Mian (2001), Lehn and Zhao 
(2006), Rosen (1986), and Chan (1996), I try to relate turnovers of CEOs and CFOs with a firm’s 
financial policies.  By considering the origin of the executives, I extend their analyses.   
 The origin of new executives influences the firm’s management policy as well as the 
workers’ incentives to work.  The new executives from outside are more likely to change the 
corporate strategy and mission, while the new executives from inside are more likely to maintain 
stability and continuity of the firm (Friedman and Singh, 1989).  Filling executive positions with 
insiders provides workers with incentives to put more efforts into their work.  In contrast, 
allowing outsiders to fill the positions reduces such incentives for insiders (Agrawal, Knoeber, 
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and Tsoulouhas, 2006; Chan, 1996).  In addition, the risk preference of CEOs and CFOs are 
connected to the corporate financial policies (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010).   
 By considering the turnover of CEOs and CFOs and a corporate merger together, I 
analyze the comprehensive effects of a firm’s organizational changes on the financial policies.  I 
also examine the different financial decisions made by new CEOs and CFOs and trace how they 
adjust their decisions over time.  In addition, I examine the variances between the new 
executives who came from inside and outside. 
 
2.2.3.  Method of Payment and Relative Size of a Target 
 The method of payment in a merger reveals the merging firms’ value indirectly.  Fishman 
(1989), Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990), and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) show 
that high-valued bidding firms use cash or higher proportion of cash to signal their value to the 
market.  However, if there is uncertainty about the target’s value, the bidding firms may not want 
to use cash, since the target will accept only a cash offer greater than its true value, which risks 
overpayment.  Hansen (1987) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) address this issue and suggest that 
bidding firms use cash offers when there is high uncertainty about their own value, and stock 
offers when there is high uncertainty on the target’s value.  Therefore, controlling the method of 
payment may capture the financial risk related with uncertainty in a merger and reveal the firm’s 
response to it.  In addition, I divide the relative size of a target into four categories to find the 
possible size effect on the choice of financial policies.   
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3. Empirical Analysis 
 I use quarterly data to construct three financial variables.  By comparing the values of 
those variables for two consecutive quarters, I examine how a firm immediately responds to its 
organizational changes and how it adjusts its financial policy in the following quarter.   Equation 
(1) represents a firm’s immediate response to its organizational changes in the quarter that a 
merger is completed.  Equation (2) describes how a firm adjusts its choice of financial policies in 
the following quarter.            denotes the change of financial variable for two consecutive 
quarters. 
 
                                                      (1) 
                                            (2)  
      where t is the quarter that a merger completes 
  
 In the analysis of cash holdings policy, I consider changes in the logs of the variable to 
prevent the effect generated by a firm’s size.5  By examining               and                
for three financial variables, I find answers to the following questions. 
 
     Q1: Does a firm make the choice of financial policies depending on how the merger is 
 evaluated in the market? 
     
     Q2: Is a firm’s choice of financial policies affected by CEO and CFO turnover?  If so, is there 
 any difference in the effects on the financial policies between the turnover of CEOs and 
 CFOs? 
                                                        
5
 I use                                                     for equation (1) and                    
                                    for equation (2). 
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     Q3: Does the turnover effect of CEOs and CFOs on the firm’s choice of financial policies 
 vary depending on their origins? 
 
     Q4: Does a firm’s choice of financial policies vary depending on the method of payment and 
 relative size of target? 
 
     Q5: Is there any difference between a firm’s immediate response and its follow-up 
 adjustment to  organizational changes? 
      
 To answer the above questions, I set up a regression model for each financial variable.  
Equation (3) in the following is the general form of that regression model.  
 
           6                                            (3) 
 
 CAR represents the cumulative abnormal return in the merger announcement period.  
This variable is an informative indicator of the significance of a firm’s organizational change and 
reflects how the market evaluates the merger (Friedman and Singh, 1989).  Therefore, including 
CAR in the analysis is expected to capture how sensitively a firm changes and adjusts its 
financial policies tied with market valuation on the merger.  In order to check the robustness of 
the effect, I employ CAR which is computed for [-2, 1] (four days of event window) and for       
[-3, 1] (five days of event window).
7
   
 The executive stands for the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which occurred less than a year 
before a merger.  This turnover variable is expected to represent the differences in the attitude 
toward corporate financial risk between new CEOs and new CFOs.  First, I categorize executive 
                                                        
6
 For the simplicity, I omitted subscripts of t-1, t, and t+1.  
7
  Market begins responding to the announcement two days in advance and the announcement typically appears in 
the Wall Street Journal the after it is released (Filson, 2004). 
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into three cases without considering the origin of new CEOs and CFOs.  Each of the following 
terms: CEO, CFO, and CEO&CFO denotes the turnover of CEO, CFO, and both CEO and CFO, 
respectively.  Secondly, I conduct further investigations into the turnover effect by taking the 
origin of new CEOs and CFOs into account.  This approach examines the variations in attitude 
toward financial risk which vary depending on the origin of new CEOs and CFOs as well as the 
title of new executives.  In this analysis, I subdivide executive into six categories: CEO_I, 
CEO_O, CFO_I, CFO_O, CEO&CFO_I, and CEO&CFO_O.  By adding capital letter “I” and 
“O” next to each of CEO, CFO and CEO&CFO, I have each variable reveal where the executive 
came from.  “_I” and “_O” stand for the new executive who came from inside and outside, 
respectively.   
   The mop represents the method of payment offered by a bidding firm in a merger.  I 
classify mop into five types: cash, combination of cash and stock, stock, other, and unknown
8
.  
The size denotes the relative size of target which is computed as the ratio of market value of the 
bidding firm and the target.  The market value is the product of the price 30 days before the 
announcement date and common shares outstanding on CRSP.
9
  I divide size into four 
categories: Xsmall (less than 9.99%), Small (10% to 49.99%), Large (50% to 99.99%), and 
Xlarge (greater than 100%).  By including the relative size of target, I expect to capture market 
reactions, which I predict may vary depending on the size of the target.      
 At first, I run a regression of each financial variable on the control variables described 
above using equation (4).  This analysis depicts how a firm determines its financial policies 
immediately after the organizational changes.  By considering the origin of new CEOs and 
                                                        
8
 Other includes options, warrants, rights, or combination of them. 
9
The relative size of target has been measured in many different ways in the previous studies, making 
generalizations about its effects difficult.  I compute relative size of target following Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 
(2002). 
13 
 
CFOs, I try to find the probable variations in a firm’s financial policies resulted from the origin 
of new CEOs and CFOs.       
 
                                                             (4) 
 
 Secondly, I examine how each financial variable is affected by the control variables in 
the following quarter using regression (5).  This analysis shows how a firm adjusts its choice of 
financial policies which were determined immediately after a merger.  By considering the origin 
of new CEOs and CFOs, I investigate the differences in financial policy which may result from 
the different origin of new CEOs and CFOs. 
 
                                                               (5) 
 
 Lastly, I investigate whether or not a firm’s choice of financial policies changes over time 
by comparing the firm’s immediate response to its follow-up adjustment.  This analysis is 
expected to capture the dynamics in a firm’s choice of financial policies.   
 
3.1.  Financial Leverage
10
 
 I start the analysis by running regressions of financial leverage which is the ratio of the 
sum of short-term and long-term debt to book value of total asset.  A firm’s choice of higher 
leverage is regarded as taking a riskier financial policy.  This analysis examines the factors 
affecting a firm’s choice of financial leverage policy and inspects how a firm adjusts its leverage 
                                                        
10
 In the following sections, I put independent variables name used in the regression into the parenthesis for the 
clarity of explanations. 
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level in response to organizational changes over time.  Table 3.1 and 3.2 report a firm’s 
immediate change of financial leverage in the quarter that a merger completes.  Table 3.3 and 3.4 
show the follow-up adjustment of leverage level conducted by the firm in the following quarter.  
In particular, Table 3.2 and 3.4 display in a more detailed way how a firm’s financial leverage is 
affected by the origin of new CEOs and CFOs. 
 
3.1.1  Immediate Changes in Financial Leverage 
 I compare the financial leverage level reported in the quarter that a merger completes 
with that reported in the previous quarter.  Therefore, the changes found during this period 
(               in the equation (6)) explain a firm’s immediate responses to organizational 
changes through financial leverage policy.  The variable representing immediate changes of a 
firm’s financial leverage is defined as following. 
 
                                                          (6) 
where t is the quarter that a merger completes.   
 
 As table 3.1 reports, turnovers of CEOs (CEO) and CFOs (CFO) immediately increase 
financial leverage.
11
 While the influence of CFOs is not significant, the turnover of CEOs has 
significant influence on the increase of financial leverage immediately after a merger.  When 
both CEO and CFO positions are filled by new executives (CEO&CFO), they decrease financial 
leverage level and reduce financial risks of the firm.  Table 3.2 provides a more detailed 
description when the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is considered.  Regardless of their origin, 
new CFOs (both CFO_I and CFO_O) increase financial leverage immediately after a merger.  
                                                        
11
 For clarity of explanations, I use independent variable names which are used in the regression to describe the 
effects of turnovers.  They are put in the parenthesis in italic type. 
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However, new CEOs make conflicting decisions based on their origin.  While new CEOs who 
originated internally (CEO_I) lower leverage level, new CEOs who came from outside (CEO_O) 
raise it and take riskier leverage policies; they raise the level high enough to offset the decrease 
incurred by the new CEOs who came from inside (CEO_I).  This variation resulting from the 
different origin of CEOs is consistent with earlier literature.  While CEOs are promoted from 
within in normal time, outsiders are brought in to shake things up (Agrawal, Knoeber, and 
Tsoulouhas, 2000; Friedman and Singh, 1989).  In addition, the significant impact of the 
turnover of CEOs is also in line with Chava and Purnanandam (2010); financial leverage of a 
firm is significantly related with the risk preference of CEO. 
 As CAR in the merger announcement period increases, the firm increases financial 
leverage level.  Based on my interpretation, I suggest that when the merger is evaluated 
positively in the market, the firm implements a more aggressive management and takes riskier 
financial policies by increasing its leverage level.  Instead, as a protection device for this 
increased financial risk, the firm is found to raise long-term debt to total debt ratio 
simultaneously.
12
     
 Other findings on the effect of method of payment and relative size of target are broadly 
consistent with previous literature.  When the target value is uncertain, bidding firms tend to use 
stock as a method of payment to reduce risk (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002), and this 
trend seems to link to the firm’s choice of decreasing financial leverage; when stock is used as a 
method of payment, the firm significantly decreases its financial leverage level.  In contrast, the 
firm is found to increase the leverage level when it uses cash as a method of payment.  Since 
firms have incentives to use cash as a method of payment for a merger when they are highly 
                                                        
12
 This simultaneous increase of long-term debt to total debt ratio is explained again in the next section, Debt 
Maturity Structure. 
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valued (Fishman, 1989; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990; and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel, 
1990), those highly valued firms have room to choose riskier financial policies by increasing 
their leverage level.    
 The relative size of target does not have any significant impact on the financial leverage 
policy during this period.  However, the patterns of the changes incurred by the relative size of 
target imply that a firm takes the size effect into account.  In a merger, the firm implements more 
aggressive management and takes riskier financial policy of higher leverage level.     
 
3.1.2.  Follow-Up Adjustment of Financial Leverage  
 The change of financial leverage found during this period (               in the 
equation (7)) describes a firm’s follow-up adjustment of financial leverage in the following 
quarter.  The variable describing a firm’s follow-up adjustment is defined by the following 
equation. 
 
                                                            (7) 
      where t is the quarter that a merger completes. 
  
 Table 3.3 reports that any type of turnovers does not have a significant effect on a firm’s 
financial leverage policy in the following quarter.  The only difference from the immediate 
change is found in the insignificant and negative relationship with the turnover of CEOs (CEO).  
This effect is found significant and positive in the quarter that a merger completes.  As table 3.4 
reports, new CEOs adjust financial leverage in the opposite direction depending on their origin in 
the follow-up adjustment period.  New CEOs who come from outside (CEO_O) decrease the 
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leverage level and those who came from inside (CEO_I) increase the level.  While both effects 
are found not to be significant, the follow-up adjustment of decreasing the financial leverage 
level is driven by the CEOs who come from outside (CEO_O) just as it was in the immediate 
response.  
 In the follow-up adjustment period, a firm determines its financial leverage policy 
responding to how the market sees the merger.  A firm still continues to take an aggressive 
financial policy of higher leverage level when the market evaluates the merger favorably.  While 
the influences of method of payment and the relative size of target are not found significant, a 
firm’s response to the relative size of target is found contrary to what the firm did in the previous 
quarter.  As the target size becomes greater, the firm lowers the leverage level to reduce financial 
risk in the following quarter.  This implies that while a firm makes an immediate choice of 
riskier financial leverage policy, it puts more weight on the financial stability in the follow-up 
adjustment stage. 
 
3.2.  Cash Holdings 
 I next analyze how a firm changes and adjusts its cash holdings in response to 
organizational changes.  A firm’s choice of lower cash holdings is regarded as taking a riskier 
financial policy.  If cash holdings are considered as negative debt, then the arguments for 
financial leverage policy can be applied to the interpretation of a cash holdings policy.  Table 4.1 
and 4.2 report a firm’s immediate changes of cash holdings in a quarter that a merger completes.  
Table 4.3 and 4.4, on the other hand, show the firm’s follow-up adjustment of its cash holdings 
in the following quarter.  Table 4.2 and 4.4 show in a more detailed way how a firm’s cash 
holdings are affected by the origin of new CEOs and CFOs. 
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3.2.1.  Immediate Changes of Cash Holdings 
 I compare cash holdings level reported in the quarter that a merger completes with that 
reported in the previous quarter.  The changes found during this period (                  in 
the equation (8)) describe a firm’s immediate responses to organizational changes through cash 
holdings policy.  The variable representing this immediate change in cash holdings is defined as 
following.  
 
                                                                         (8) 
                                                                     where t is the quarter that a merger completes. 
 
 Table 4.1 shows that while turnovers of CEOs (CEO) and CFOs (CFO) do not have a 
significant impact, they take different cash holdings policy.  While new CEOs (CEO) reduce 
cash holdings, new CFOs(CFO) increase the level and implement risk reducing financial policy.  
In contrast, when both CEO and CFO positions are filled by new executives (CEO&CFO), their 
decision on cash holdings level is not clear.  Table 4.2 provides more detailed descriptions on the 
firm’s choice when the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is taken into account.  Only when both of  
CEO and CFO positions are filled by new executives (CEO&CFO_I and CEO&CFO_O), cash 
holdings level changes in a significant way immediately after a merger.  New executives who 
come from inside (CEO&CFO_I) decreases but those who come from outside (CEO&CFO_O) 
increase cash holdings.  This implies that a firm’s cash holdings change in a significant way 
immediately after a merger only when both of financial decision-makers are replaced, since they 
can share their responsibility for taking a policy by making the decision together.  The new 
executives who come from inside (CEO&CFO_I) take riskier policy since they are better 
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informed of the firm’s financial conditions, but those who come from outside (CEO&CFO_O) 
take risk reducing policy.   
 The cash holdings level increases when the market evaluates the merger favorably.  
Considering the positive relationship of financial leverage with CAR, the patterns found in the 
immediate change of cash holdings suggest that a firm manages its financial risk by coordinating 
the choice of financial leverage and cash holdings.  On the one hand, a firm takes a riskier 
financial policy by increasing financial leverage, but on the other hand, the firm takes safety 
measures by raising cash holdings to offset the financial risk.    
 The use of cash as a method of payment decreases cash holdings immediately after a 
merger regardless of controls while the changes are not significant.  The results reported in table 
4.1 and 4.2 suggest that a firm makes use of its cash holdings policy in order to reduce financial 
risk generated possibly from the target size.  When merging with a target that is larger than its 
own, the firm increases cash holdings and lowers financial risk.  On the contrary, when merging 
with a target that is smaller than its own, the firm reduces cash holdings and has some room to 
face higher financial risk. 
 
3.2.2.  Follow-Up Adjustment of Cash Holdings 
 I compare cash holdings levels reported in the quarter that a merger completes with that 
reported in the following quarter.  The variations found during this period (                  
in the equation (9)) explain a firm’s follow-up adjustments of its cash holdings policy in the 
following quarter.  The variable representing the adjustment in the following quarter is defined 
as following. 
 
20 
 
                                                                     (9) 
                                                                     where t is the quarter that a merger completes. 
 
  As table 4.3 reports, the cash holdings level significantly increase in the follow-up 
adjustment period when the CEO positions are filled with new executives (CEO).  On the 
contrary, new CFOs (CFO) decrease cash holdings.  Comparing to their decisions made 
immediately after a merger, new CEOs (CEO) and CFOs (CFO) changes cash holding level in an 
opposite direction to what they did.  The new CEOs become more cautious in running cash 
holdings during the follow-up adjustment period and this decision is driven by the new CEOs 
who come from outside (CEO_O) as table 4.4 reports.  
 Table 4.4 provides more detailed descriptions on the effects of turnovers by considering 
the origin of new CEOs and CFOs.  The first difference from the immediate choice of the policy 
lies in the increased influence of new CEOs who come from outside (CEO_O).  While turnover 
of CEOs has positive relationship with cash holdings, its effect becomes significant during the 
follow-up adjustment period.  Further, this increased influence of new CEOs is driven by those 
who come from outside (CEO_O).  The second difference is found in the turnover of both CEOs 
and CFOs (CEO&CFO).  The effect of turnover of both CEOs and CFOs is found opposite from 
the previous period.  Those who come from inside (CEO&CFO_I) increase cash holdings but 
those who come from outside decrease (CEO&CFO_O) the level significantly.  While new 
CEOs from outside (CEO_O) seem to take risk reducing cash holdings policy during the follow-
up adjustment period, they become more aggressive and take riskier policy if they can share the 
responsibility by making decision together with new CFOs (CEO&CFO_O).   
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The influence of CAR is found negative but the firm pays less attention to how the market sees 
the merger at the follow-up adjustment stage.     
 
3.3.  Debt Maturity Structure 
 Lastly, I examine the change of the debt maturity structure when a firm completes a 
merger along with new CEOs and CFOs.  Compared to financial leverage and cash holdings 
policy, which are the broad aspects of corporate financial policy, the debt maturity structure is 
regarded as a finer aspect of corporate financial policy.  The CFO is expected to exert a stronger 
influence on the debt maturity structure policy (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010).  Following 
Barclay and Smith (1995), I broadly classify debt into short term and long term depending on 
whether its maturity is less than three years or not.  Short-term debt affects a firm’s financial 
status in many ways: it exposes a firm to excessive liquidation by the lenders (Diamond, 1991); 
high short-term debt may result in higher earnings volatility by exposing the firm to refinancing 
and interest rate risk (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010).  
 Table 5.1 and 5.2 report a firm’s immediate changes of its debt maturity structure in the 
quarter that a merger completes.  Table 5.3 and 5.4, on the other hand, show the firm’s follow-up 
adjustment of debt maturity policy in the following quarter. 
 
3.3.1.  Immediate Changes of Debt Maturity Structure 
 I compare debt maturity structure reported in the quarter that a merger completes to that 
reported in the previous quarter.  The changes found during this period (                   in 
the equation (10)) describe a firm’s immediate reaction to a merger, especially when the turnover 
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of CEOs and CFOs is involved.  The variable representing this immediate change of debt 
maturity structure is defined by the following equation. 
 
                                                        (10)  
      where t is the quarter that a merger completes.        
 
 As reported in table 5.1, turnovers of CEOs (CEO) and CFOs (CFO) do not have 
significant effects on the debt maturity structure.  While turnover of CFOs (CFO) is found to 
have positive effects for all controls, the effects of turnover of CEOs (CEO) are found to vary 
over controls.  When the relative size of target is taken into account, turnover of CEOs (CEO) 
has a negative effect on the debt maturity structure and decreases long-term debt to total debt 
ratio.  However, table 5.2 reports that the positive effect of turnover of CFOs (CFO) is 
determined by new CFOs who come from outside.   These new CFOs (CFO_O) significantly 
increase long-term debt to total debt ratio and immediately lower financial risk such as 
refinancing and interest rate risks.  This finding is consistent with the expectation that the CFO is 
involved in the finer aspects of corporate financial policy or in the choice of debt maturity 
structure.  In making this choice, new CEOs and CFOs who come from outside increase long-
term debt to total debt ratio, while those who come from inside decrease it   
 Long-term debt to total debt ratio is negatively related with CAR during this period, 
while the relationship is not significant.  Since the market considers the merger favorably, the 
firm may have a room to decrease the ratio and use more short-term debt in spite of some 
probable financial risks.  The method of payment does not seem to be an important factor in the 
debt maturity policy.  A firm takes a different debt maturity policy depending on the relative size 
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of target.  When merging with a smaller target, a firm decreases long-term debt to total debt ratio 
and takes a riskier debt maturity structure.  While the change of the debt ratio is not significant, 
the firm becomes more cautious and takes a safer debt maturity structure by increasing the ratio 
when the target is a similar or larger sized firm. 
 
3.3.2.  Follow-Up Adjustment of Debt Maturity Structure 
 Changes in debt maturity structure (                   in the equation (11)) found in 
this analysis capture a firm’s follow-up adjustment of debt maturity structure in the following 
quarter.  The variable representing this adjustment of debt maturity structure is defined by the 
following equation. 
 
                                                               (11) 
                                                                     where t is the quarter that a merger completes. 
 
 Table 5.3 and 5.4 report that there are no significant changes incurred by turnovers of 
CEOs and CFOs in the following quarter.  However, I find some patterns in the relationship that 
the origin of new CEOs and CFOs has with debt maturity structure.  Both new CEOs and CFOs  
(CEO_I and CFO_I) who came from inside increase long-term debt to total debt ratio.  On the 
contrary, new CEOs and CFOs who came from outside (CEO_O and CFO_O) decrease the ratio.  
Comparing to the patterns found in a firm’s immediate response to organizational changes, the 
debt maturity structure in the following quarter changes in the opposite direction responding to 
the origin of CEOs and CFOs.   
 It is only CAR that incurs significant change of long-term debt to total debt ratio in the 
follow-up adjustments period.  While the debt maturity structure has insignificant and negative 
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relationship with CAR immediately after a merger, a firm adjusts and increases the ratio 
significantly in the following quarter as the market evaluates the merger favorably.  The relative 
size of target is found not to cause any difference in the debt ratio between immediate change 
and follow-up adjustment.  When merging with a smaller target, a firm decreases the ratio, but 
the firm increases the ratio if the target is a similar or larger sized firm.   However, this size 
effect on the debt maturity structure is weakened and found insignificant in the follow-up 
adjustment period. 
 
3.4.  Organizational Changes, Financial Policies, and Financial Risk   
 Since a firm’s financial policy is not explained by a simple combination of financial 
variables, I take a more comprehensive approach to understand the choice of financial policies.  
A firm’s financial policies are systemically and dynamically connected, working together in 
order to control financial risk at the time of corporate organizational changes.  In addition, CEOs 
and CFOs are found to implement complementary financial policies.   
 A firm’s financial leverage and debt maturity structure help determine the immediate 
response in the face of its organizational changes, whereas cash holdings are adopted for the 
firm’s follow-up adjustment in the following quarter.  In the quarter that a merger completes, 
new CEOs who come from outside (CEO_O) raise financial risk by making immediate choice of 
increasing financial leverage.  Responding to this, new CFOs who come from outside (CFO_O) 
simultaneously raise long-term debt to total debt ratio to offset the financial risk increased by 
higher financial leverage.  Although cash holdings are not significantly affected by turnovers of 
CEOs and CFOs at this period, new CEOs who come from outside (CEO_O) take safety 
measures in the follow-up period by significantly increasing cash holdings.  I interpret these 
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findings to suggest that new CEOs who come from outside aggressively increase financial 
leverage for investment immediately after a merger.  In response to this, both of new CEOs and 
new CFOs who come from outside take financial policies to offset the financial risk resulted 
from higher leverage.  New CFOs who come from outside change debt maturity structure 
simultaneously.  In the follow-up adjustment period, the CEOs who have increased leverage 
level in the previous period raise cash holdings level. 
   From a firm’s response to CAR, I find that a firm has room to make more aggressive 
financial decision when the merger is considered beneficial in the market.  Although 
continuously increases its financial leverage level, the firm tries to control its financial risks 
through simultaneous increase of cash holdings as well as follow-up adjustment of its debt 
maturity structure.     
  
4. Conclusion 
 I provide empirical evidence for the systematic connection within a firm’s financial 
policies in the time of organizational change.  For this study, I employ two corporate events as 
organizational changes: a corporate merger and turnovers of CEOs and CFOs.  Corporate merger 
is considered as the integration of two separate organizations and turnovers are interpreted as 
reorganizations inside of a firm.  Using financial variables of financial leverage, cash holdings, 
and debt maturity structure, I analyze how a firm implements its financial policies responding to 
the organizational changes.  By comparing the values of each financial variable over time, I find 
a close connection between financial variables and financial risk management of a firm.  
Moreover, I trace the dynamics of financial variables around the time of organizational changes. 
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 The first response of a firm to its organizational changes is to change financial leverage 
and debt maturity structure immediately after a merger.  The change of financial leverage is 
implemented by new CEOs and affected by how the market evaluates the merger.  In the quarter 
that a merger completes, new CEOs who come from outside (CEO_O) immediately increase 
financial leverage level.  Moreover, this financial leverage also increases as the market evaluates 
the merger positively.  In contrast, the change of debt maturity structure is driven by new CFOs 
who come from outside (CFO_O).  The CFOs increase long-term debt to total debt ratio 
simultaneously with the increase of financial leverage.   
 In the follow-up adjustment period, cash holdings and debt maturity structure are 
adjusted.   During this period, the CEOs (CEO_O) who increased financial leverage immediately 
after a merger increase cash holdings.  In addition,   debt maturity starts responding to the 
market.  As the market evaluates the merger positively, the firm increases long-term debt to total 
debt ratio significantly. 
 These findings imply that a firm’s financial risk is carefully handled through the 
combination of financial policies.  Furthermore, CEOs and CFOs collaborate to manage financial 
risk of a firm, while they are in charge of different financial variables.  This study on corporate 
financial policies suggests that a comprehensive analysis on the organizational changes should be 
conducted in order to better understand of a firm’s financial policies.  While firm-specific and 
non-managerial factors are without doubt important, corporate organizational aspects seem very 
important as well especially when the firm conducts a merger.  In addition, incorporating both 
CEOs and CFOs into the analysis seems to enhance the understanding of a firm’s choice of 
financial policies since corporate decisions are often made in teams.          
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Table 1   Corporate Merger and Turnover of CEOs and CFOs  
 
All mergers are successfully completed between January 1, 1996 and March 31, 2007.  The changes of CEO and 
President are included in the CEO turnover.  Since CFO is often titled with different name, I capture as CFO all 
executives with the title of treasurer, finance, vice president-finance, and controller. 
 
 CEO  CFO  CEO & CFO  NO Changes Total 
Number of 
Turnovers 
146 211 78 560 995 
% of 
Turnovers 
14.7 % 21.2 % 7.8 % 56.3 %  
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Table 2   New CEOs and CFOs and Their Origins 
 
While the CEO positions are filled evenly by insiders and outsiders, the CFO positions are filled mainly by 
outsiders.  The one issue that occurs in the categorization is the case that both of CEO and CFO turnovers occur 
before a merger.  This issue is found in 32 cases and I categorize them following the origin of the executive who 
receives higher compensation.   
 
 CEO CFO CEO & CFO Total 
Internal Promotion 73 52 40 165 
Coming from Outside 63 157 29 249 
Coming from Target 10 2 9 21 
Total 146 211 78 435 
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Table 3.1  Immediate Change of Financial Leverage  
 
This table presents estimates from a regression of financial leverage on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which 
occurs before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                        where t is the 
quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                reflects how immediately new CEOs and CFOs change 
corporate leverage after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger announcement period and 
reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of market on the merger.  In this 
analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is not considered.  Method of Payment shows how a bidding firm pays 
for the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and bidding firm.  The market 
value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares outstanding on CRSP.   
 
 Event Window [-2, 1] Event Window [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
0.2430 
(3.63***) 
0.1801 
(2.71***) 
0.2717 
(3.74***) 
0.2073 
(2.89***) 
0.2213 
(3.40***) 
0.1694 
(2.65***) 
0.2362 
(3.36***) 
0.1862 
(2.72***) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO 
0.0158 
(2.31) 
0.0114 
(1.71*) 
0.0149 
(2.06**) 
0.0109 
(1.53) 
0.0158 
(2.30**) 
0.0114 
(1.70*) 
0.0151 
(2.07**) 
0.0110 
(1.55) 
       CEO & CFO 
-0.0176 
(-1.99**) 
-0.0135 
(-1.57) 
-0.0151 
(-1.59) 
-0.0117 
(-1.27) 
-0.0170 
(-1.91**) 
-0.0129 
(-1.50) 
-0.0149 
(-1.57) 
-0.0115 
(-1.24) 
       CFO 
0.0018 
(0.25) 
0.0021 
(0.30) 
0.0001 
(0.02) 
0.0008 
(0.10) 
0.0012 
(0.17) 
0.0015 
(0.21) 
-0.0002 
(-0.03) 
0.0005 
(0.07) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
0.0414 
(4.53***) 
 
0.0408 
(3.90***) 
 
0.0422 
(4.63***) 
 
0.0416 
(3.98***) 
       Cash and Stock  
0.0066 
(0.67) 
 
0.0013 
(0.11) 
 
0.0052 
(0.54) 
 
-0.0007 
(-0.06) 
       Other  
-0.0118 
(-0.69) 
 
-0.0104 
(-0.48) 
 
-0.0111 
(-0.65) 
 
-0.0086 
(-0.40) 
       Stock  
-0.0170 
(-1.80*) 
 
-0.0228 
(-2.08**) 
 
-0.0178 
(-1.89*) 
 
-0.0242 
(-2.23**) 
       Unknown  
-0.0192 
(-1.28) 
 
-0.0089 
(-0.45) 
 
-0.0186 
(-1.24) 
 
-0.0081 
(-0.41) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
-0.0076 
(-0.69) 
-0.0155 
(-1.41) 
  
-0.0073 
(-0.66) 
-0.0161 
(-1.46) 
       Small   
-0.0003 
(-0.03) 
0.0023 
(0.20) 
  
-0.0011 
(-0.09) 
0.0019 
(0.17) 
       Large   
0.0087 
(0.49) 
0.0103 
(0.60) 
  
0.0072 
(0.40) 
0.0096 
(0.56) 
       Xlarge   
-0.0008 
(-0.03) 
0.0030 
(0.13) 
  
0.0012 
(0.05) 
0.0046 
(0.20) 
Intercept 
0.0166 
(2.99***) 
0.0088 
(1.35) 
0.0223 
(2.28**) 
0.0198 
(1.75*) 
0.0168 
(3.00***) 
0.0093 
(1.42) 
0.0223 
(2.27**) 
0.0209 
(1.84*) 
               
 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table 3.2  Immediate Change of  Financial Leverage  (Considering the Origin of new CEOs and  
CFOs) 
 
This table presents estimates from a regression of financial leverage on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which 
occurs before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                        where t is the 
quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                reflects how immediately new CEOs and CFOs change 
corporate leverage after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger announcement period and 
reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of market on the merger.  In this 
analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is considered.  Method of Payment shows how a bidding firm pays for 
the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and bidding firm.  The market 
value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares outstanding on CRSP.  
Capital “I” and “O” added after CEO and CFO denote the new executive come from inside and outside, 
respectively. 
Variable Event Window [-2, 1] Event Window [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
0.2375 
(3.51***) 
0.1775 
(2.65***) 
0.2682 
(3.66***) 
0.2050 
(2.84***) 
0.2140 
(3.26***) 
0.1657 
(2.58***) 
0.2310 
(3.26***) 
0.1830 
(2.65***) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO_I 
0.0004 
(0.03) 
-0.0063 
(-0.48) 
-0.0015 
(-0.10) 
-0.0066 
(-0.47) 
0.0007 
(0.05) 
-0.0063 
(-0.48) 
-0.0006 
(-0.04) 
-0.0062 
(-0.44) 
       CEO_O 
0.0234 
(2.64***) 
0.0198 
(2.29**) 
0.0224 
(2.35**) 
0.0188 
(2.04**) 
0.0231 
(2.60***) 
0.0196 
(2.27**) 
0.0222 
(2.32**) 
0.0187 
(2.02**) 
       CEO & CFO_I 
-0.0028 
(-0.20) 
-0.0018 
(-0.13) 
-0.0022 
(-0.14) 
-0.0003 
(-0.02) 
-0.0022 
(-0.16) 
-0.0014 
(-0.10) 
-0.0016 
(-0.11) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
       CEO & CFO_O 
-0.0318 
(-1.95*) 
-0.0230 
(-1.45) 
-0.0276 
(-1.54) 
-0.0217 
(-1.25) 
-0.0314 
(-1.91*) 
-0.0222 
(-1.39) 
-0.0283 
(-1.57) 
-0.0220 
(-1.26) 
       CFO_I 
0.0069 
(0.66) 
0.0069 
(0.68) 
0.0056 
(0.49) 
0.0074 
(0.66) 
0.0062 
(0.59) 
0.0063 
(0.62) 
0.0053 
(0.46) 
0.0074 
(0.65) 
       CFO_O 
0.0040 
(0.34) 
0.0044 
(0.38) 
0.0033 
(0.26) 
0.0024 
(0.19) 
0.0037 
(0.31) 
0.0040 
(0.35) 
0.0030 
(0.24) 
0.0019 
(0.16) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
0.0416 
(4.55***) 
 
0.0406 
(3.88***) 
 
0.0424 
(4.65***) 
 
0.0414 
(3.95***) 
       Cash and Stock  
0.0060 
(0.61) 
 
0.0003 
(0.02) 
 
0.0047 
(0.48) 
 
-0.0017 
(-0.15) 
       Other  
-0.0124 
(-0.73) 
 
-0.0093 
(-0.43) 
 
-0.0117 
(-0.69) 
 
-0.0075 
(-0.34) 
       Stock  
-0.0171 
(-1.78*) 
 
-0.0235 
(-2.10**) 
 
-0.0178 
(-1.86*) 
 
-0.0249 
(-2.24**) 
       Unknown  
-0.0181 
(-1.20) 
 
-0.0081 
(-0.41) 
 
-0.0176 
(-1.17) 
 
-0.0073 
(-0.37) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
-0.0093 
(-0.82) 
-0.0172 
(-1.50) 
  
-0.0093 
(-0.81) 
-0.0179 
(-1.56) 
       Small   
-0.0015 
(-0.13) 
0.0012 
(0.11) 
  
-0.0024 
(-0.21) 
0.0008 
(0.07) 
       Large   
0.0060 
(0.34) 
0.0077 
(0.45) 
  
0.0045 
(0.25) 
0.0071 
(0.41) 
       Xlarge   
0.0049 
(0.20) 
0.0082 
(0.36) 
  
0.0071 
(0.30) 
0.0100 
(0.43) 
Intercept 
0.0139 
(2.41**) 
0.0061 
(0.91) 
0.0212 
(2.11**) 
0.0189 
(1.64) 
0.0142 
(2.43**) 
0.0066 
(0.98) 
0.0214 
(2.11**) 
0.0200 
(1.73*) 
           
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table 3.3  Follow-Up Adjustment of Financial Leverage 
 
This table presents estimates from a regression of financial leverage on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which 
occurs before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                        where t is the 
quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                 reflects how immediately new CEOs and CFOs change 
corporate leverage after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger announcement period and 
reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of market on the merger.  In this 
analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is not considered.  Method of Payment shows how a bidding firm pays 
for the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and bidding firm.  The market 
value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares outstanding on CRSP.   
 
 Event Window [-2, 1] Event Window [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
0.0999 
(2.28**) 
0.1012 
(2.25**) 
0.1081 
(2.29**) 
0.1068 
(2.20**) 
0.0780 
(1.83) 
0.0797 
(1.84) 
0.0826 
(1.81) 
0.0830 
(1.79) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO 
-0.0017 
(-0.38) 
-0.0018 
(-0.41) 
-0.0007 
(-0.15) 
-0.0012 
(-0.24) 
-0.0017 
(-0.39) 
-0.0019 
(-0.42) 
-0.0006 
(-0.13) 
-0.0011 
(-0.23) 
       CEO & CFO 
-0.0020 
(-0.35) 
-0.0021 
(-0.36) 
-0.0024 
(-0.38) 
-0.0025 
(-0.40) 
-0.0019 
(-0.32) 
-0.0019 
(-0.32) 
-0.0024 
(-0.39) 
-0.0025 
(-0.40) 
       CFO 
0.0037 
(0.78) 
0.0040 
(0.82) 
0.0030 
(0.58) 
0.0037 
(0.69) 
0.0036 
(0.75) 
0.0038 
(0.77) 
0.0030 
(0.57) 
0.0036 
(0.68) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
0.0026 
(0.42) 
 
0.0029 
(0.41) 
 
0.0033 
(0.53) 
 
0.0035 
(0.49) 
       Cash and Stock  
-0.0060 
(-0.91) 
 
-0.0061 
(-0.81) 
 
-0.0068 
(-1.04) 
 
-0.0072 
(-0.94) 
       Other  
0.0119 
(1.03) 
 
0.0158 
(1.08) 
 
0.0123 
(1.07) 
 
0.0168 
(1.15) 
       Stock  
0.0048 
(0.74) 
 
0.0019 
(0.26) 
 
0.0040 
(0.62) 
 
0.0009 
(0.12) 
       Unknown  
-0.0133 
(-1.30) 
 
-0.0145 
(-1.09) 
 
-0.0128 
(-1.25) 
 
-0.0139 
(-1.05) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
0.0054 
(0.76) 
0.0048 
(0.64) 
  
0.0057 
(0.80) 
0.0046 
(0.62) 
       Small   
0.0053 
(0.71) 
0.0057 
(0.77) 
  
0.0050 
(0.67) 
0.0056 
(0.75) 
       Large   
-0.0096 
(-0.83) 
-0.0097 
(-0.84) 
  
-0.0107 
(-0.92) 
-0.0106 
(-0.91) 
       Xlarge   
-0.0011 
(-0.07) 
-0.0008 
(-0.05) 
  
0.0000 
(0.00) 
0.0005 
(0.03) 
Intercept 
0.0011 
(0.31) 
0.0008 
(0.18) 
-0.0021 
(-0.33) 
-0.0017 
(-0.22) 
0.0010 
(0.28) 
0.0008 
(0.18) 
-0.0023 
(-0.37) 
-0.0014 
(-0.18) 
           
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table 3.4  Follow-Up Adjustment of Financial Leverage (Considering the Origin of new CEOs and 
CFOs) 
 
This table presents estimates from a regression of financial leverage on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which 
occurs before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                       where t is the 
quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                reflects how immediately new CEOs and CFOs change 
corporate leverage after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger announcement period and 
reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of market on the merger.  In this 
analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is considered.  Method of Payment shows how a bidding firm pays for 
the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and bidding firm.  The market 
value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares outstanding on CRSP.  
Capital “I” and “O” added after CEO and CFO denote the new executive come from inside and outside, 
respectively. 
Variable Event Window [-2, 1] Event Window [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
0.1000 
(2.25**) 
0.1016 
(2.23**) 
0.1088 
(2.28**) 
0.1073 
(2.19**) 
0.0781 
(1.81) 
0.0800 
(1.82) 
0.0831 
(1.80) 
0.0835 
(1.78) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO_I 
0.0062 
(0.69) 
0.0068 
(0.75) 
0.0029 
(0.30) 
0.0030 
(0.31) 
0.0064 
(0.72) 
0.0069 
(0.76) 
0.0033 
(0.35) 
0.0033 
(0.34) 
       CEO_O 
-0.0056 
(-0.96) 
-0.0057 
(-0.97) 
-0.0033 
(-0.53) 
-0.0036 
(-0.57) 
-0.0058 
(-0.99) 
-0.0058 
(-0.99) 
-0.0034 
(-0.54) 
-0.0037 
(-0.58) 
       CEO & CFO_I 
-0.0051 
(-0.54) 
-0.0051 
(-0.55) 
-0.0058 
(-0.60) 
-0.0056 
(-0.56) 
-0.0046 
(-0.50) 
-0.0047 
(-0.50) 
-0.0055 
(-0.56) 
-0.0053 
(-0.53) 
       CEO & CFO_O 
-0.0002 
(-0.02) 
-0.0006 
(-0.06) 
0.0009 
(0.08) 
0.0003 
(0.02) 
-0.0005 
(-0.05) 
-0.0006 
(-0.06) 
0.0003 
(0.02) 
-0.0002 
(-0.02) 
       CFO_I 
0.0043 
(0.62) 
0.0032 
(0.46) 
0.0021 
(0.27) 
0.0018 
(0.24) 
0.0039 
(0.57) 
0.0029 
(0.41) 
0.0020 
(0.26) 
0.0019 
(0.24) 
       CFO_O 
0.0005 
(0.06) 
0.0015 
(0.19) 
0.0033 
(0.40) 
0.0041 
(0.49) 
0.0005 
(0.06) 
0.0014 
(0.18) 
0.0033 
(0.40) 
0.0040 
(0.48) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
0.0024 
(0.39) 
 
0.0030 
(0.42) 
 
0.0031 
(0.50) 
 
0.0035 
(0.49) 
       Cash and Stock  
-0.0058 
(-0.87) 
 
-0.0058 
(-0.76) 
 
-0.0066 
(-0.99) 
 
-0.0068 
(-0.89) 
       Other  
0.0120 
(1.03) 
 
0.0156 
(1.06) 
 
0.0123 
(1.06) 
 
0.0165 
(1.12) 
       Stock  
0.0048 
(0.73) 
 
0.0020 
(0.26) 
 
0.0041 
(0.62) 
 
0.0010 
(0.14) 
       Unknown  
-0.0134 
(-1.30) 
 
-0.0147 
(-1.10) 
 
-0.0129 
(-1.25) 
 
-0.0142 
(-1.06) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
0.0058 
(0.78) 
0.0052 
(0.67) 
  
0.0059 
(0.79) 
0.0049 
(0.63) 
       Small   
0.0057 
(0.75) 
0.0060 
(0.79) 
  
0.0053 
(0.70) 
0.0058 
(0.76) 
       Large   
-0.0090 
(-0.77) 
-0.0091 
(-0.77) 
  
-0.0100 
(-0.85) 
-0.0099 
(-0.84) 
       Xlarge   
-0.0025 
(-0.16) 
-0.0021 
(-0.14) 
  
-0.0012 
(-0.08) 
-0.0008 
(-0.05) 
Intercept 
0.0021 
(0.56) 
0.0018 
(0.40) 
-0.0017 
(-0.26) 
-0.0014 
(-0.18) 
0.0020 
(0.53) 
0.0019 
(0.41) 
-0.0019 
(-0.28) 
-0.0010 
(-0.13) 
           
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table 4.1  Immediate Change of Cash Holdings 
 
This table presents estimates from a regression of cash holdings on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which occurs 
before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                                       where t 
is the quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                   reflects how immediately new CEOs and CFOs 
change cash holdings level after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger announcement period 
and reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of market on the merger.  In 
this analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is not considered.  Method of Payment shows how a bidding firm 
pays for the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and bidding firm.  The 
market value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares outstanding on 
CRSP.   
 Event Window of [-2, 1] Event Window of [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
0.3055 
(1.49) 
0.3733 
(1.77*) 
0.2418 
(1.07) 
0.3460 
(1.51) 
0.1567 
(0.79) 
0.2094 
(1.04) 
0.0726 
(0.33) 
0.1489 
(0.68) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO 
-0.0199 
(-0.96) 
-0.0159 
(-0.76) 
-0.0211 
(-0.94) 
-0.0178 
(-0.79) 
-0.0200 
(-0.96) 
-0.0163 
(-0.77) 
-0.0209 
(-0.93) 
-0.0180 
(-0.79) 
       CEO & CFO 
-0.0019 
(-0.07) 
-0.0047 
(-0.18) 
0.0067 
(0.24) 
0.0049 
(0.17) 
-0.0016 
(-0.06) 
-0.0037 
(-0.14) 
0.0066 
(0.23) 
0.0052 
(0.18) 
       CFO 
0.0218 
(0.97) 
0.0206 
(0.91) 
0.0144 
(0.58) 
0.0129 
(0.52) 
0.0216 
(0.96) 
0.0200 
(0.89) 
0.0143 
(0.58) 
0.0127 
(0.51) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
-0.0305 
(-1.04) 
 
-0.0311 
(-0.92) 
 
-0.0260 
(-0.89) 
 
-0.0270 
(-0.80) 
       Cash and Stock  
-0.0456 
(-1.47) 
 
-0.0172 
(-0.47) 
 
-0.0487 
(-1.57) 
 
-0.0205 
(-0.56) 
       Other  
0.0402 
(0.73) 
 
0.0015 
(0.02) 
 
0.0413 
(0.75) 
 
0.0028 
(0.04) 
       Stock  
0.0437 
(1.47) 
 
0.0699 
(2.02**) 
 
0.0395 
(1.33) 
 
0.0649 
(1.87) 
       Unknown  
-0.0079 
(-0.17) 
 
-0.0231 
(-0.72) 
 
-0.0062 
(-0.13) 
 
-0.0201 
(-0.32) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
0.0257 
(0.73) 
0.0374 
(1.03) 
  
0.0282 
(0.80) 
0.0383 
(1.05) 
       Small   
-0.0529 
(-1.45) 
-0.0565 
(-1.55) 
  
-0.0540 
(-1.48) 
-0.0572 
(-1.56) 
       Large   
-0.0711 
(-1.23) 
-0.0703 
(-1.22) 
  
-0.0780 
(-1.35) 
-0.0775 
(-1.34) 
       Xlarge   
0.0984 
(1.30) 
0.0893 
(1.19) 
  
0.1038 
(1.38) 
0.0964 
(1.28) 
Intercept 
-0.0890 
(-5.32***) 
-0.0824 
(-4.00***) 
-0.0857 
(-2.72***) 
-0.0963 
(-2.58***) 
-0.0911 
(-5.41***) 
-0.0840 
(-4.06***) 
-0.0892 
(-2.81***) 
-0.0983 
(-2.62***) 
        0.2798 0.2789 0.2886 0.2874 0.2804 0.2798 0.2892 0.2883 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table 4.2  Immediate Change of Cash Holdings (Considering the Origin of New CEOs and CFOs) 
This table presents estimates from a regression of cash holdings on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which occurs 
before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                                       where t 
is the quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                   reflects how immediately new CEOs and CFOs 
change cash holdings after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger announcement period and 
reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of market on the merger.  In this 
analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is considered.  Method of Payment shows how a bidding firm pays for 
the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and bidding firm.  The market 
value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares outstanding on CRSP.  
Capital “I” and “O” added after CEO and CFO denote the new executive come from inside and outside, 
respectively. 
 Event Window [-2, 1] Event Window [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
0.3715 
(1.81*) 
0.4290 
(2.04**) 
0.2944 
(1.32) 
0.4003 
(1.76*) 
0.2303 
(1.16) 
0.2747 
(1.36) 
0.1253 
(0.58) 
0.2012 
(0.92) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO_I 
-0.0520 
(-1.22) 
-0.0434 
(-1.02) 
-0.0562 
(-1.22) 
-0.0454 
(-0.99) 
-0.0501 
(-1.17) 
-0.0424 
(-0.99) 
-0.0540 
(-1.17) 
-0.0436 
(-0.94) 
       CEO_O 
0.0177 
(0.66) 
0.0218 
(0.81) 
0.0202 
(0.69) 
0.0226 
(0.78) 
0.0167 
(0.62) 
0.0206 
(0.76) 
0.0194 
(0.67) 
0.0214 
(0.73) 
       CEO & CFO_I 
-0.0806 
(-1.89*) 
-0.0841 
(-1.97**) 
-0.0881 
(-1.92*) 
-0.0915 
(-1.99**) 
-0.0793 
(-1.86*) 
-0.0824 
(-1.92*) 
-0.0870 
(-1.89*) 
-0.0895 
(-1.94*) 
       CEO & CFO_O 
0.1052 
(2.30**) 
0.1011 
(2.21**) 
0.1368 
(2.74***) 
0.1330 
(2.67***) 
0.1043 
(2.27**) 
0.1014 
(2.20**) 
0.1350 
(2.69***) 
0.1313 
(2.63***) 
       CFO_I 
0.0126 
(0.38) 
0.0069 
(0.21) 
-0.0064 
(-0.18) 
-0.0160 
(-0.44) 
0.0114 
(0.35) 
0.0055 
(0.17) 
-0.0072 
(-0.20) 
-0.0163 
(-0.44) 
       CFO_O 
-0.0029 
(-0.08) 
-0.0022 
(-0.06) 
-0.0063 
(-0.16) 
-0.0027 
(-0.07) 
-0.0030 
(-0.08) 
-0.0027 
(-0.08) 
-0.0063 
(-0.16) 
-0.0034 
(-0.09) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
-0.0370 
(-1.27) 
 
-0.0403 
(-1.21) 
 
-0.0324 
(-1.11) 
 
-0.0359 
(-1.07) 
       Cash and Stock  
-0.0507 
(-1.64) 
 
-0.0161 
(-0.45) 
 
-0.0540 
(-1.75*) 
 
-0.0198 
(-0.55) 
       Other  
0.0548 
(1.00) 
 
0.0089 
(0.13) 
 
0.0560 
(1.02) 
 
0.0103 
(0.15) 
       Stock  
0.0329 
(1.10) 
 
0.0652 
(1.86*) 
 
0.0290 
(0.97) 
 
0.0601 
(1.72*) 
       Unknown  
-0.0000 
(-0.00) 
 
-0.0177 
(-0.29) 
 
0.0014 
(0.03) 
 
-0.0147 
(-0.24) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
0.0563 
(1.57) 
0.0689 
(1.85*) 
  
0.0584 
(1.62) 
0.0691 
(1.85*) 
       Small   
-0.0417 
(-1.15) 
-0.0450 
(-1.24) 
  
-0.0430 
(-1.18) 
-0.0461 
(-1.26) 
       Large   
-0.0732 
(-1.27) 
-0.0728 
(-1.27) 
  
-0.0799 
(-1.39) 
-0.0798 
(-1.39) 
       Xlarge   
0.0586 
(0.77) 
0.0490 
(0.65) 
  
0.0645 
(0.85) 
0.0569 
(0.75) 
Intercept 
-0.0947 
(-5.46***) 
-0.0826 
(-3.94***) 
-0.1116 
(-3.47***) 
-0.1182 
(-3.14***) 
-0.0962 
(-5.51***) 
-0.0838 
(-3.98***) 
-0.1145 
(-3.54***) 
-0.1194 
(-3.15***) 
         0.2780 0.2772 0.2857 0.2844 0.2788 0.2781 0.2863 0.2854 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table 4.3  Follow-Up Adjustment of Cash Holdings  
 
This table presents estimates from a regression of cash holdings on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which occurs 
before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                                       where t 
is the quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                    reflects how immediately new CEOs and CFOs 
change cash holdings after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger announcement period and 
reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of market on the merger.  In this 
analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is not considered.  Method of Payment shows how a bidding firm pays 
for the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and bidding firm.  The market 
value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares outstanding on CRSP. 
 Event Window of [-2, 1] Event Window of [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
-0.1659 
(-1.05) 
-0.1693 
(-1.03) 
-0.1737 
(-1.00) 
-0.1588 
(-0.89) 
-0.2387 
(-1.56) 
-0.2367 
(-1.51) 
-0.2563 
(-1.54) 
-0.2418 
(-1.43) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO 
0.0351 
(2.18**) 
0.0340 
(2.08**) 
0.0358 
(2.07**) 
0.0343 
(1.96**) 
0.0352 
(2.19**) 
0.0341 
(2.09**) 
0.0360 
(2.09**) 
0.0345 
(1.97**) 
       CEO & CFO 
-0.0288 
(-1.42) 
-0.0276 
(-1.35) 
-0.0257 
(-1.17) 
-0.0242 
(-1.10) 
-0.0230 
(-1.47) 
-0.0285 
(-1.40) 
-0.0267 
(-1.22) 
-0.0251 
(-1.14) 
       CFO 
-0.0063 
(-0.36) 
-0.0064 
(-0.37) 
-0.0101 
(-0.53) 
-0.0101 
(-0.52) 
-0.0054 
(-0.31) 
-0.0056 
(-0.32) 
-0.0093 
(-0.49) 
-0.0093 
(-0.48) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
0.0158 
(0.69) 
 
0.0190 
(0.73) 
 
0.0161 
(0.71) 
 
0.0197 
(0.76) 
       Cash and Stock  
-0.0224 
(-0.92) 
 
-0.0095 
(-0.34) 
 
-0.0220 
(-0.91) 
 
-0.0085 
(-0.30) 
       Other  
0.0010 
(0.02) 
 
-0.0119 
(-0.22) 
 
0.0004 
(1.02) 
 
-0.0134 
(-0.25) 
       Stock  
0.0227 
(0.98) 
 
0.0347 
(1.29) 
 
0.0216 
(0.94) 
 
0.0340 
(1.27) 
       Unknown  
-0.0171 
(-0.47) 
 
-0.0323 
(-0.67) 
 
-0.0162 
(-0.44) 
 
-0.0318 
(-0.66) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
0.0088 
(0.32) 
0.0110 
(0.39) 
  
0.0104 
(0.38) 
0.0126 
(0.45) 
       Small   
-0.0278 
(-0.99) 
-0.0284 
(-1.00) 
  
-0.0276 
(-0.98) 
-0.0282 
(-1.00) 
       Large   
0.0939 
(2.10**) 
0.0959 
(2.14**) 
  
0.0904 
(2.03**) 
0.0925 
(2.07**) 
       Xlarge   
-0.0748 
(-1.29) 
-0.0785 
(-1.34) 
  
-0.0732 
(-1.26) 
-0.0768 
(-1.32) 
Intercept 
-0.0337 
(-2.59***) 
-0.0383 
(-2.39**) 
-0.0333 
(-1.37) 
-0.0462 
(-1.60) 
-0.0352 
(-2.71***) 
-0.0397 
(-2.48**) 
-0.0360 
(-1.48) 
-0.0491 
(-1.69*) 
        0.2168 0.2173 0.2226 0.2231 0.2163 0.2169 0.2221 0.2226 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
38 
 
Table 4.4  Follow-Up Adjustment of Cash Holdings (Considering the Origin of new CEOs and 
CFOs) 
This table presents estimates from a regression of cash holdings on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which occurs 
before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                                      where t 
is the quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                   reflects how immediately new CEOs and CFOs 
change cash holdings after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger announcement period and 
reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of market on the merger.  In this 
analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is considered.  Method of Payment shows how a bidding firm pays for 
the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and bidding firm.  The market 
value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares outstanding on CRSP.  
Capital “I” and “O” added after CEO and CFO denote the new executive come from inside and outside, 
respectively. 
 Event Window [-2, 1] Event Window [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
-0.1853 
(-1.17) 
-0.1916 
(-1.17) 
-0.1831 
(-1.06) 
-0.1747 
(-0.98) 
-0.2701 
(-1.77*) 
-0.2704 
(-1.73*) 
-0.2726 
(-1.64) 
-0.2630 
(-1.56) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO_I 
-0.0055 
(-0.17) 
-0.0028 
(-0.08) 
-0.0031 
(-0.09) 
0.0023 
(0.06) 
-0.0046 
(-0.14) 
-0.0022 
(-0.07) 
-0.0024 
(-0.07) 
0.0027 
(0.08) 
       CEO_O 
0.0576 
(2.76***) 
0.0562 
(2.68***) 
0.0562 
(2.49**) 
0.0538 
(2.37**) 
0.0577 
(2.78***) 
0.0564 
(2.69***) 
0.0565 
(2.51**) 
0.0541 
(2.39**) 
       CEO & CFO_I 
0.0378 
(1.15) 
0.0412 
(1.24) 
0.0367 
(1.03) 
0.0407 
(1.13) 
0.0389 
(1.18) 
0.0422 
(1.28) 
0.0367 
(1.03) 
0.0408 
(1.14) 
       CEO & CFO_O 
-0.0920 
(-2.61***) 
-0.0934 
(-2.63***) 
-0.0861 
(-2.22**) 
-0.0881 
(-2.27**) 
-0.0957 
(-2.71***) 
-0.0968 
(-2.73***) 
-0.0886 
(-2.29**) 
-0.0904 
(-2.33**) 
       CFO_I 
0.0009 
(0.04) 
-0.0048 
(-0.19) 
0.0012 
(0.04) 
-0.0068 
(-0.24) 
0.0013 
(0.05) 
-0.0043 
(-0.17) 
0.0014 
(0.05) 
-0.0066 
(-0.23) 
       CFO_O 
0.0012 
(0.04) 
0.0037 
(0.13) 
-0.0049 
(-0.16) 
-0.0019 
(-0.06) 
0.0024 
(0.09) 
0.0047 
(0.17) 
-0.0035 
(-0.12) 
-0.0007 
(-0.02) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
0.0188 
(0.83) 
 
0.0230 
(0.88) 
 
0.0193 
(0.86) 
 
0.0237 
(0.92) 
       Cash and Stock  
-0.0227 
(-0.95) 
 
-0.0117 
(-0.42) 
 
-0.0223 
(-0.93) 
 
-0.0106 
(-0.38) 
       Other  
-0.0056 
(-0.13) 
 
-0.0153 
(-0.29) 
 
-0.0067 
(-0.16) 
 
-0.0172 
(-0.32) 
       Stock  
0.0265 
(1.14) 
 
0.0368 
(1.35) 
 
0.0255 
(1.10) 
 
0.0362 
(1.33) 
       Unknown  
-0.0170 
(-0.47) 
 
-0.0328 
(-0.69) 
 
-0.0159 
(-0.44) 
 
-0.0322 
(-0.68) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
-0.0015 
(-0.05) 
-1.44e-06 
(-0.00) 
  
0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.0015 
(0.054) 
       Small   
-0.0327 
(-1.16) 
-0.0332 
(-1.17) 
  
-0.0326 
(-1.16) 
-0.0331 
(-1.17) 
       Large   
0.0864 
(1.94*) 
0.0890 
(1.99**) 
  
0.0826 
(1.86*) 
0.0854 
(1.92*) 
       Xlarge   
-0.0521 
(-0.89) 
-0.0558 
(-0.94) 
  
-0.0501 
(-0.85) 
-0.0537 
(-0.91) 
Intercept 
-0.0408 
(-3.04***) 
-0.0469 
(-2.88***) 
-0.0321 
(-1.28) 
-0.0453 
(-1.54) 
-0.0426 
(-3.17***) 
-0.0485 
(-2.98***) 
-0.0349 
(-1.40) 
-0.0483 
(-1.65*) 
        0.2151 0.2154 0.2214 0.2218 0.2145 0.2149 0.2208 0.2212 
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table 5.1  Immediate Change of Debt Maturity Structure 
 
This table presents estimates from a regression of Debt Maturity on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which occurs 
before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                                    where t is 
the quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                     reflects how immediately new CEOs and CFOs 
change debt maturity structure after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger announcement 
period and reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of market on the 
merger.  In this analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is not considered.  Method of Payment shows how a 
bidding firm pays for the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and bidding 
firm.  The market value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares 
outstanding on CRSP. 
 Event Window [-2, 1] Event Window [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
-0.2726 
(-1.08) 
-0.3686 
(-1.41) 
-0.2613 
(-0.95) 
-0.3496 
(-1.24) 
-0.1626 
(-0.66) 
-0.2331 
(-0.92) 
-0.1656 
(-0.62) 
-0.2285 
(-0.84) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO 
0.0057 
(0.21) 
0.0050 
(0.18) 
-0.0030 
(-0.10) 
-0.0042 
(-0.14) 
0.0054 
(0.20) 
0.0047 
(0.17) 
-0.0038 
(-0.13) 
-0.0051 
(-0.17) 
       CEO & CFO 
-0.0316 
(-0.86) 
-0.0294 
(-0.78) 
-0.0409 
(-1.04) 
-0.0409 
(-1.02) 
-0.0310 
(-0.84) 
-0.0291 
(-0.77) 
-0.0400 
(-1.02) 
-0.0400 
(-0.99) 
       CFO 
0.0260 
(0.90) 
0.0244 
(0.83) 
0.0439 
(1.38) 
0.0451 
(1.40) 
0.0256 
(0.89) 
0.0244 
(0.83) 
0.0438 
(1.37) 
0.0451 
(1.39) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
0.0329 
(0.96) 
 
0.0303 
(0.78) 
 
0.0293 
(0.85) 
 
0.0277 
(0.71) 
       Cash and Stock  
-0.0108 
(-0.27) 
 
-0.0239 
(-0.52) 
 
-0.0085 
(-0.21) 
 
-0.0220 
(-0.48) 
       Other  
0.0076 
(0.12) 
 
0.0050 
(0.06) 
 
0.0071 
(0.11) 
 
0.0051 
(0.06) 
       Stock  
-0.0452 
(-1.11) 
 
-0.0488 
(-1.07) 
 
-0.0416 
(-1.02) 
 
-0.0454 
(-1.00) 
       Unknown  
0.0155 
(0.27) 
 
0.0374 
(0.54) 
 
0.0137 
(0.24) 
 
0.0345 
(0.50) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
-0.0996 
(-2.34**) 
-0.1145 
(-2.57**) 
  
-0.1022 
(-2.40**) 
-0.1165 
(-2.61***) 
       Small   
-0.1047 
(-2.31**) 
-0.0943 
(-2.04**) 
  
-0.1041 
(-2.30**) 
-0.0945 
(-2.04**) 
       Large   
0.0418 
(0.61) 
0.0426 
(0.61) 
  
0.0473 
(0.69) 
0.0491 
(0.70) 
       Xlarge   
0.1625 
(1.76*) 
0.1662 
(1.78*) 
  
0.1590 
(1.71*) 
0.1619 
(1.73*) 
Intercept 
0.0314 
(1.41) 
0.0274 
(1.06) 
0.1107 
(2.83***) 
0.1172 
(2.62***) 
0.0327 
(1.46) 
0.0293 
(1.13) 
0.1129 
(2.89***) 
0.1195 
(2.67***) 
           
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table 5.2  Immediate Change of Debt Maturity Structure (Considering the Origin of New CEOs 
and CFOs) 
This table presents estimates from a regression of debt maturity structure on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which 
occurs before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                                    
where t is the quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                   reflects how immediately new CEOs 
and CFOs change debt maturity structure after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger 
announcement period and reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of 
market on the merger.  In this analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is considered.  Method of Payment shows 
how a bidding firm pays for the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and 
bidding firm.  The market value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares 
outstanding on CRSP.  Capital “I” and “O” added after CEO and CFO denote the new executive come from inside 
and outside, respectively. 
 Event Window [-2, 1] Event Window [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
-0.2812 
(-1.14) 
-0.3995 
(-1.56) 
-0.2766 
(-1.02) 
-0.3695 
(-1.33) 
-0.1559 
(-0.64) 
-0.2436 
(-0.98) 
-0.1632 
(-0.62) 
-0.2288 
(-0.85) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO_I 
-0.1089 
(-2.04**) 
-0.1194 
(-2.21**) 
-0.0984 
(-1.72*) 
-0.1037 
(-1.80*) 
-0.1086 
(-2.03**) 
-0.1180 
(-2.18**) 
-0.0976 
(-1.70*) 
-0.1023 
(-1.77*) 
       CEO_O 
0.0491 
(1.45) 
0.0529 
(1.52) 
0.0356 
(0.97) 
0.0354 
(0.94) 
0.0489 
(1.44) 
0.5230 
(1.50) 
0.0343 
(0.93) 
0.0338 
(0.90) 
       CEO & CFO_I 
-0.0715 
(-1.24) 
-0.0778 
(-1.33) 
-0.0628 
(-1.02) 
-0.0682 
(-1.08) 
-0.0708 
(-1.22) 
-0.0768 
(-1.30) 
-0.0612 
(-0.99) 
-0.0659 
(-1.04) 
       CEO & CFO_O 
0.0500 
(0.73) 
0.0664 
(0.95) 
0.0168 
(0.23) 
0.0274 
(0.37) 
0.0507 
(0.74) 
0.0657 
(0.94) 
0.0169 
(0.23) 
0.0265 
(0.35) 
       CFO_I 
-0.0173 
(-0.44) 
-0.0162 
(-0.41) 
-0.0098 
(-0.22) 
-0.0066 
(-0.15) 
-0.0174 
(-0.44) 
-0.0162 
(-0.41) 
-0.0104 
(-0.24) 
-0.0076 
(-0.17) 
       CFO_O 
0.0986 
(2.24**) 
0.0942 
(2.11**) 
0.1186 
(2.48**) 
0.1157 
(2.39**) 
0.0971 
(2.21**) 
0.0930 
(2.07**) 
0.1181 
(2.47**) 
0.1155 
(2.38**) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
0.0387 
(1.16) 
 
0.0352 
(0.91) 
 
0.0344 
(1.03) 
 
0.0322 
(0.84) 
       Cash and Stock  
-0.0193 
(-0.49) 
 
-0.0212 
(-0.47) 
 
-0.0168 
(-0.43) 
 
-0.0191 
(-0.42) 
       Other  
0.0198 
(0.32) 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.00) 
 
0.0192 
(0.31) 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.00) 
       Stock  
-0.0550 
(-1.36) 
 
-0.0467 
(-1.02) 
 
-0.0508 
(-1.25) 
 
-0.0425 
(-0.93) 
       Unknown  
0.0158 
(0.28) 
 
0.0329 
(0.48) 
 
0.0140 
(0.25) 
 
0.0298 
(0.43) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
-0.0764 
(-1.71*) 
-0.0885 
(-1.92*) 
  
-0.0795 
(-1.79*) 
-0.0912 
(-1.97**) 
       Small   
-0.0957 
(-2.12**) 
-0.0847 
(-1.84*) 
  
-0.0952 
(-2.10**) 
-0.0851 
(-1.84*) 
       Large   
0.0304 
(0.44) 
0.0315 
(0.46) 
  
0.0371 
(0.54) 
0.0392 
(0.57) 
       Xlarge   
0.1417 
(1.52) 
0.1417 
(1.51) 
  
0.1376 
(1.47) 
0.1371 
(1.45) 
Intercept 
0.0225 
(0.98) 
0.0182 
(0.69) 
0.0857 
(2.10**) 
0.0877 
(1.91*) 
0.0241 
(1.04) 
0.0205 
(0.77) 
0.0886 
(2.17**) 
0.0909 
(1.98**) 
           
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table 5.3  Follow-Up Adjustment of Debt Maturity Structure  
 
This table presents estimates from a regression of debt maturity structure on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which 
occurs before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                                    
where t is the quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                     reflects how immediately new CEOs 
and CFOs change debt maturity structure after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger 
announcement period and reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of 
market on the merger.  In this analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is not considered.  Method of Payment 
shows how a bidding firm pays for the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target 
and bidding firm.  The market value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common 
shares outstanding on CRSP. 
 Event Window [-2, 1] Event Window [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
0.2279 
(2.32**) 
0.2133 
(2.10**) 
0.256 
(2.39**) 
0.2433 
(2.21**) 
0.2282 
(2.39**) 
0.2166 
(2.22**) 
0.2567 
(2.46**) 
0.2472 
(2.33**) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO 
0.0019 
(0.19) 
0.0012 
(0.12) 
-0.0008 
(-0.08) 
-0.0019 
(-0.17) 
0.0015 
(0.14) 
0.0007 
(0.07) 
-0.0013 
(-0.12) 
-0.0024 
(-0.22) 
       CEO & CFO 
-0.0015 
(-0.12) 
0.0006 
(0.04) 
-0.0011 
(-0.08) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
0.0019 
(0.15) 
0.0003 
(0.02) 
0.0017 
(0.13) 
       CFO 
-0.0005 
(-0.04) 
-0.0018 
(-0.16) 
0.0020 
(0.16) 
0.0016 
(0.13) 
-0.0013 
(-0.12) 
-0.0026 
(-0.24) 
0.0011 
(0.09) 
0.0007 
(0.06) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
0.0112 
(0.79) 
 
0.0160 
(0.99) 
 
0.0119 
(0.84) 
 
0.0167 
(1.04) 
       Cash and Stock  
-0.0020 
(-0.13) 
 
-0.0012 
(-0.07) 
 
-0.0029 
(-0.19) 
 
-0.0026 
(-0.15) 
       Other  
-0.0371 
(-1.39) 
 
-0.0233 
(-0.71) 
 
-0.0372 
(-1.39) 
 
-0.0235 
(-0.71) 
       Stock  
0.0100 
(0.69) 
 
0.0113 
(0.69) 
 
0.0105 
(0.72) 
 
0.0116 
(0.70) 
       Unknown  
0.0179 
(0.78) 
 
-0.0028 
(-0.10) 
 
0.0177 
(0.77) 
 
-0.0021 
(-0.07) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
-0.0046 
(-0.28) 
-0.0054 
(-0.32) 
  
-0.0057 
(-0.35) 
-0.0069 
(-0.40) 
       Small   
0.0040 
(0.24) 
0.0038 
(0.22) 
  
0.0025 
(0.15) 
0.0025 
(0.14) 
       Large   
-0.0034 
(-0.13) 
-0.0009 
(-0.03) 
  
-0.0014 
(-0.05) 
0.0013 
(0.05) 
       Xlarge   
0.0040 
(0.12) 
0.0026 
(0.07) 
  
0.0046 
(0.14) 
0.0031 
(0.09) 
Intercept 
-0.0053 
(-0.66) 
-0.0108 
(-1.08) 
-0.0038 
(-0.26) 
-0.0108 
(-0.64) 
-0.0048 
(-0.59) 
-0.0104 
(-1.04) 
-0.0022 
(-0.15) 
-0.0090 
(-0.53) 
           
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level      
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Table 5.4 Follow-Up Adjustment of Debt Maturity Structure(Considering the Origin of new CEOs 
and CFOs) 
This table presents estimates from a regression of debt maturity structure on the turnover of CEOs and CFOs which 
occurs before the merger.  Dependent variable is                                                   where t is 
the quarter that the merger occurs. Therefore,                    reflects how immediately new CEOs and CFOs 
change debt maturity structure after the completion of a merger.  CAR is computed in the merger announcement 
period and reflects how new executives change their financial policy to meet the expectation of market on the 
merger.  In this analysis, the origin of new CEOs and CFOs is considered.  Method of Payment shows how a bidding 
firm pays for the target.  Relative Size of Target is computed as a market value between target and bidding firm.  
The market value here is the product of 30 days before the announcement date and common shares outstanding on 
CRSP.  Capital “I” and “O” added after CEO and CFO denote the new executive come from inside and outside, 
respectively. 
 Event Window [-2, 1] Event Window [-3, 1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 
0.5034 
(2.38**) 
0.4988 
(2.28**) 
0.5603 
(2.44**) 
0.5459 
(2.30**) 
0.5019 
(2.43**) 
0.5009 
(2.37**) 
0.5501 
(2.47**) 
0.5376 
(2.36**) 
Turnover of Executives         
       CEO_I 
0.0594 
(1.30) 
0.0565 
(1.22) 
0.0637 
(1.31) 
0.0621 
(1.26) 
0.0588 
(1.29) 
0.0555 
(1.20) 
0.0625 
(1.29) 
0.0608 
(1.24) 
       CEO_O 
-0.0177 
(-0.61) 
-0.0239 
(-0.80) 
-0.0292 
(-0.94) 
-0.0355 
(-1.11) 
-0.0166 
(-0.57) 
-0.0227 
(-0.76) 
-0.0275 
(-0.88) 
-0.0339 
(-1.06) 
       CEO & CFO_I 
0.0086 
(0.17) 
0.0171 
(0.34) 
0.0215 
(0.41) 
0.0284 
(0.53) 
0.0100 
(0.20) 
0.0189 
(0.37) 
0.0227 
(0.43) 
0.0294 
(0.55) 
       CEO & CFO_O 
-0.0358 
(-0.61) 
-0.0298 
(-0.50) 
-0.0473 
(-0.75) 
-0.0416 
(-0.65) 
-0.0359 
(-0.61) 
-0.0291 
(-0.49) 
-0.0461 
(-0.73) 
-0.0398 
(-0.62) 
       CFO_I 
0.0203 
(0.61) 
0.0168 
(0.50) 
0.0428 
(1.15) 
0.0358 
(0.94) 
0.0185 
(0.55) 
0.0148 
(0.44) 
0.0410 
(1.10) 
0.0341 
(0.89) 
       CFO_O 
-0.0348 
(-0.92) 
-0.0367 
(-0.94) 
-0.0516 
(-1.26) 
-0.0492 
(-1.18) 
-0.0349 
(-0.92) 
-0.0370 
(-0.96) 
-0.0527 
(-1.28) 
-0.0505 
(-1.21) 
Method of Payment         
       Cash  
0.0187 
(0.65) 
 
0.0314 
(0.95) 
 
0.0205 
(0.71) 
 
0.0329 
(1.00) 
       Cash and Stock  
-0.0036 
(-0.11) 
 
-0.0031 
(-0.08) 
 
-0.0051 
(-0.15) 
 
-0.0052 
(-0.14) 
       Other  
-0.0752 
(-1.42) 
 
-0.0569 
(-0.80) 
 
-0.0764 
(-1.44) 
 
-0.0577 
(-0.81) 
       Stock  
0.0208 
(0.60) 
 
0.0240 
(0.62) 
 
0.0199 
(0.58) 
 
0.0221 
(0.57) 
       Unknown  
0.0393 
(0.81) 
 
0.0047 
(0.08) 
 
0.0411 
(0.85) 
 
0.0079 
(0.14) 
Relative Size of Target         
       Xsmall   
-0.0275 
(-0.73) 
-0.0307 
(-0.78) 
  
-0.0237 
(-0.63) 
-0.0280 
(-0.72) 
       Small   
-0.0024 
(-0.06) 
-0.0026 
(-0.07) 
  
-0.0015 
(-0.04) 
-0.0011 
(-0.03) 
       Large   
0.0158 
(0.27) 
0.0220 
(0.37) 
  
0.0147 
(0.25) 
0.0214 
(0.37) 
       Xlarge   
0.0140 
(0.18) 
0.0113 
(0.14) 
  
0.0105 
(0.13) 
0.0077 
(0.10) 
Intercept 
-0.0087 
(-0.44) 
-0.0158 
(-0.70) 
0.0088 
(0.26) 
-0.0027 
(-0.07) 
-0.0079 
(-0.40) 
-0.0151 
(-0.67) 
0.0076 
(0.22) 
-0.0034 
(-0.09) 
           
*      significant at the 10% level    
**    significant at the 5% level      
***  significant at the 1% level     
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Table A.1 
The Number of Mergers Available in Each Year 
 
I collect 995 mergers at random which were successfully completed between January 1, 1996 and March 31, 2007 from Business Wire 
and PR Newswire in Lexis-Nexis Academic and Thomson ONE Banker.  By comparing merger samples, I filter out the cases which 
are included in both data sources.  To exclude rumor effects on the returns of bidding firms, I select the mergers which are announced 
with the terms such as finished, completed, or finalized.  Both of bidding and target firms are publicly traded on the AMEX, Nasdaq, 
or NYSE. 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Business Wire &  PR 
Newswire 
39 40 31 31 33 43 29 29 36 37 30 12 390 
Thomson One Bankers 44 79 75 75 40 48 32 69 75 24 41 3 605 
Total Available Mergers 83 119 106 106 73 91 61 98 111 61 71 15 995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
